Ethnic policy – the barrier of nation building in Afghanistan

Nation building is a normative concept that means different things to different people. The latest conceptualization is essentially that nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or "failed states" or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability. Nation building generally assumes that someone or something is doing the building intentionally.

A 2003 study by James Dobbins and others for the RAND Corporation defines nation building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy. Comparing seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, "in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II," they review the lessons learned. This definition of nation building is substantially different from those, which see nation building as the province of people within a nation. However, one of the reasons of the deep crisis in political, social and cultural areas in Afghanistan is its ethnic policy. 

Introduction. Nation building is constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. In case of Afghanistan, the problem of nation building is not theoretical and scientific issue. Above all it is relevant problem of real everyday life of this country.

Nation building in Afghanistan has barely materialized, despite the toppling of the Taliban in 2001. The United States neglected nation building in Afghanistan and provided little, if any, resources for it at the beginning of the war. In contrast, the United States committed 25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita in Kosovo than in Afghanistan. Only in the past six months, under the Obama administration, has U.S. leadership seemed to remember that counterinsurgency requires nation-building and the resources necessary to achieve such a goal.

Nation building in Afghanistan should have three pillars. First, the nation-building effort should have an international face, with participation by the UN and other countries in the region, rather than the United States and NATO alone. Second, the United States should maintain the least number of troops possible in Afghanistan while maintaining the right to disrupt al-Qaeda bases. Third, the effort should concentrate on training the local population for self-sufficiency, so that Afghans are able to manage their country and develop institutional infrastructure. The Afghan people must have a large stake in shaping and running their country.

Materials and methods. The main sources used in writing the article can be divided into the following groups: 1) historiographical sources, represented by the general and special studies, scientific and reference books that characterize this problem; 2) periodicals 3) statistical data.

The methodological basis for the study is realized with the help of general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction; especially historical, historiographical methods: systematic, comparative, each of which allows us to solve research problems. Comparative analysis method made it possible to consider the history of Afghanistan at its various stages, to determine the relationship of history and modernity, to compare different points of view on the problem of the ethnic politics in Afghanistan, to identify general patterns and features of the evolutionary development of the idea of nation building, to determine the most debatable issues (nation building, the ethno-nationalist).

Discussion. The theoretical basis of the study became the provisions of scientific works of afghan and foreign scientists- Andeshmand Muhamad Akram, Badakhshani Ghufran, Fazilyar Fazilrahman, Alberto Alesina, James Dabenz. Some aspects of the problem are considered by the authors examining questions of political ideology, state structure, ethnicity and ethnic politics of Afdhanistan- Farhang Sadiq, Habibi Abdulhi, Adil E. Shamoo, Afkhi Mahbubullah.

Results. Afghanistan today has some institutions that can claim to be national, but a pan-Afghan, national politics is still missing. The ethnic divide is increasing, ethno politics is on the rise, and both the literature of hate and demagogic politicians are gaining traction. Politicians, intellectuals and opinion leaders talk of ethnic politics openly when addressing audiences made up of their kin, but resort to vague rhetoric while on the national stage.

The fragmented state of the more than 35 million Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a key factor in this crisis. Perceiving them as a formidable ethnic group, the Pakistani establishment has savvily played a role in keeping them divided. Pashtuns in Pakistan can broadly be categorised as the integrated, the Islamists, and the nationalists [1].

Many Pashtuns hailing from the Khatak, Niazi, Yusufzai, and Tarin tribes are integrated in Pakistan. For them, the sense of belonging to a nation is far stronger than their ethnic affiliation. Based on merit and loyalty to the system, they have enjoyed prestigious positions in Pakistan - president, army chief of staff, and various ministerial positions. As of yet, however, no Pashtun has become prime minister [2].

The Islamist Pashtuns of Pakistan have largely been a tool in the hands of the country's military and intelligence agencies to use against the ethno-nationalists in the regions of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Two predominantly Pashtun Islamist parties, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and Jamiat Ulema-e- Pakistan, have been used to manipulate politics among the Pashtuns in Pakistan and to implement the Pakistani agenda in Afghanistan [3].

The ethno-nationalist Pashtuns of Pakistan have advocated for the rights of their ethnic group within the country. Led by Wali Khan’s family in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Mahmood Khan Achakzai in Balochistan, these two parties maintain good ties with Afghanistan and India as a strategic fallback when pushed into the margins by the Pakistani establishment [4].

However, they could be co-opted as they ascend to power. Their biggest gain so far has been the change of the name of the North-West Frontier Province to Khyber Pukhtunkha (which means "Pashtun quarter"). Yet their influence among the people of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is patchy at best. FATA represents a miserable case of a large ethnic group fallen into the traps of a colonial-minded Pakistani establishment. By playing with the ego of the tribes and calling them "free" and "autonomous", the people of FATA have in reality been deprived of the basic rights and progress other societies have enjoyed. The divided Pashtuns of Pakistan are unable to gain what they deserve in accordance to their population size. The Punjabi-dominated establishment has deflected their attention to focus on Afghanistan, a place where Pashtuns are perceived to be victimized [5].

However, a significant ethnic group, Pashtuns lack a government of their own. Their language is under threat from English, Urdu, Punjbai and Farsi. Education in Pashto in Pakistan brings no reward. Ethnic politics in Afghanistan has put it in competition with Farsi, and yet the language lacks a deep source of intellectual support in or outside the region. The language of strategic communication largely remains English for Pakistanis and Farsi for Afghans [6].

The many Pashtuns in Karachi are in conflict with the Mohajir Qaumi Movement over land and job opportunities. The Pashtuns of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa are in dispute with the Punjab region over water, resources, higher education, political participation, language and other issues. And Pashtuns in Afghanistan are challenged by the rise of non-Pashtun groups. The struggles of other ethnic groups for political power in Afghanistan - such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - challenges the dominant umbrella role the Pashtuns have played in the past [7].

Afghans favor a pluralistic state ensuring fair access to justice, resources, and political participation. Pluralism today is challenged by the second rise of the Taliban and Afghan former President Hamid Karzai's accommodating stance towards them. The Taliban's repression and brutality alienates many Afghans. The question is what, apart from ethnic politics and a sense of kinship, causes Karzai to try to compromise with them.

Many northern leaders of Afghanistan have been killed by the Taliban, and certain parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan have seen school closings, the killings of tribal chiefs, and lawlessness.

Afghans of all ethnic groups have stood together for a common cause but they have failed to share a common platform [8].

Afghanistan's northern neighbors lack the resources, infrastructure, political will and strength to provoke ethnic divides in Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan, kept at bay from religious fanatics and providing them access to an alternative trade and sea route, is desirable to them, no matter who rules in Kabul [9].

All of Afghanistan's neighbors are guilty to some extent of provoking ethnic divides in the country, but Pakistan especially so. Although its strategy has failed to benefit Pakistan or strengthen its position vis-a-vis its regional rivals, there are no signs that Pakistan will abandon this strategy either [10].

Pakistan believes that the policy of reconciliation will pay off to some extent for what it has invested in the Taliban. They are also observing the ethnic divide in Afghanistan and will obviously try to exploit it for their benefit [11].

Ethnicity will continue to play a dominant role in the politics of Afghanistan. The restoration of national consensus over the democratic process and the political system is key to the country's stability. Solidifying a national identity is very important to avoid tensions between ethnic groups. The politics of co-option and patronage will not help Afghanistan reduce its security expenditures or increase its development. There needs to be a visible measure of accountability and a fair distribution of national resources. Reconciliation should not be based on narrow ethnic politics or fear but on a pan-Afghan vision.

Otherwise, the subsidies that NATO countries are giving to the Afghan National Security Forces will mean keeping afloat a state that is at war with itself and unable to focus on the enemy. And this won't be sustainable, either.

Despite the successful military operation in Afghanistan and the formation of the Afghan Interim government headed by Hamid Karzai, and then the coming to power of President – Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, to tell about solving the "Afghan problem" is, perhaps, still premature [12].

Conclusion. In Afghanistan, the international community is once again faced with the challenge of dealing with a conflict that is interpreted as an ethnic one. The architects of a future Afghanistan would be well advised to work against the ethnic polarization of the country. In this paper I have tried to demonstrate that ethnicity is neither the cause of Afghan conflict nor a natural constant of human being: Ethnic groups have been created or furnished with cultural substance mainly by Western anthropologists. While ethnicity was not a domineering political factor in pre-war Afghanistan, it emerged as a main source of political and military mobilization especially since 1992. Hence acceding to ethnic demands will only strengthen those who – as has happened before on the Balkans – use ethnicity as an instrument for promoting their own interests, but will not contribute toward the resolving of the Afghan conflict. Hence, I suggest that the international power brokers in Afghanistan should consider ethnicity merely in an informal way in power- sharing arrangements, and should not stress ethnicity as the fundament of political decision-making processes. The major challenge of a suitable and sound peace process in Afghanistan is the question how to cope with the dominance of clientelistic networks.

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