Political relations between China and Kazakhstan are successful: since independence, the two countries have settled old disputes about their common border and established close political contacts. Chinese and Kazakh officials meet frequently to discuss bilateral issues and, for Kazakhstan, ―developing good neighborly relations with China is a top priority‖. Today, both share membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other regional groups committed to promote political cooperation and security.
Over the last few years Kazakhstan has implemented foreign policies aimed to improve relations with a vast array of new geopolitical actors, besides common partners such as Russia, on which the Central Asian country was formerly heavily dependent.
Using its huge potential in the hydrocarbon industry, Kazakhstan has managed to rise above all other Central Asian states in terms of political and economic importance and has turned its eyes to China as an important and powerful partner for cooperation in the economic, political, and security spheres.
In recent years Kazakhstan has become an important actor in regional international relations in Central Asia. The country's improvements have been underscored by international observers in many occasions. It is undeniable that compared to the rest of the region, Kazakhstan shows much higher levels of development. In purely macroeconomic terms, Kazakhstan’s economy is the largest in Central Asia and has shown very high growth levels for many years, recovering very fast when hit by the world economic crisis. In broader terms, Kazakhstan’s success is underscored by the fact that it is the only country in the region to be ranked among states with a high level of Human Development.
Behind these praises, however, there seems to be a well-coordinated effort by Kazakhstan and, often, its European partners to boast about the country's achievements, carefully ignoring its problems. Western journalists seem sometimes to be willing to indulge in uncritical praising of the ―Kazakh path‖, but the country still has serious infrastructure problems, combined with an intrinsically unstable authoritarian political system and a still insufficiently diversified economy.
It should therefore be remembered that no matters how impressive Kazakhstan's achievements might seem there is room for improvement: the country still needs help from its neighbours and is continuously and dynamically looking for opportunities to consolidate its growth through economic cooperation. This makes Chinese-Kazakh relations particularly important not just for the overall situation of the trade balance between the two countries, but, in a broader sense, also for the very sustainability of the ―Kazakh path‖, and for Central Asian stability in general.
Political relations between China and Kazakhstan are successful: since independence, the two countries have settled old disputes about their common border and established close political contacts. Chinese and Kazakh officials meet frequently to discuss bilateral issues and, for Kazakhstan, ―developing good neighborly relations with China is a top priority‖. Today, both share membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other regional groups committed to promote political cooperation and security. This entails strong reciprocal support in some of the two countries' most important foreign policy goals: Kazakhstan backs Beijing's ―One China‖ policy, supporting the official Chinese position on Taiwan and Tibet, while China supports Kazakhstan's bid to become a member of the WTO.
Bilateral economic relations are equally positive and have been intensifying for many years. The main factor behind the continuous improvements in trade relations is China's unmatched willingness and ability to invest. Figures in this regard are impressive: at the beginning of 2011, for example, Beijing committed to loan $1.7 billion to the Kazakh national welfare fund, $5 billion to the local petrochemical industry, and to buy Kazakh uranium for an estimated $8 billion. Increased Chinese influence is welcomed in Astana because it provides an opportunity to diversify the country's economy. For many years, trade relations remained limited to gas and oil exports from Kazakhstan to China, however trade is now slowly starting to diversify, with positive consequences for the economic interconnection of the two countries, especially in the border regions.
The improvement of bilateral relations between China and Kazakhstan underscores these developments and might, in the short term; help consolidate the achievements of the largest Central Asian republic. Over the past few months, Chinese and Kazakh officials have met to discuss economic, political, cultural and security issues. In June, Hu Jintao and N.A. Nazarbayev talked about the details of the security partnership agreed upon in 2005 and signed an agreement for the ―Development of an all-round Strategic Partnership‖, which includes a commitment to boost bilateral trade and increase meetings between high-ranking officials. At the moment the situation of Kazakh-Chinese relations could not look better: N.A. Nazarbayev and Hu Jintao seem to have a deep mutual understanding and the current Kazakh temporary presidency of the SCO will provide additional opportunities for the two presidents to meet and discuss aspects of bilateral cooperation. Chinese officials have expressed satisfaction for the current situation of trade relations and have praised the recent creation of a trade and business centre in Khorgos, at the border between Kazakhstan and China.
Kazakh and Chinese officials have excellent reasons for being happy also about the two countries' trade relations, which have reached a volume of $20 billion in 2011 (up from just $8.3 billion in 2006), much larger than trade between Kazakhstan and Russia. The initial goal set by Kazakh and Chinese officials was to reach a trade volume of $15 billion by 2015, however this goal has been surpassed four years early as the value of bilateral trade is already $5 billion above the planned level. Besides direct trade, Kazakhstan is also important for China as a transit country: among the issues recently discussed was also the improvement of railway connection between China and Kazakhstan and, from there, to Russia and Western Europe.
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Xi Jinping considered further development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and China. By the end of 2012 the trade turnover between the two states grew by 12.5% accounting for $ 24 billion. The two parties agreed to boost Kazakhstan-Chinese trade to $ 40 billion by 2015. The two sides also signed the documents on establishment of the Kazakhstan-Chinese Business Council jointly by the "Samruk-Kazyna" National Welfare Fund and the Committee on International Trade of China as well as the cooperation agreement and Road Map to promote economic relations and investment between the "Samruk-Kazyna" Fund and CITIC Group.
These developments do not simply prove that China's importance for Kazakhstan is constantly and rapidly increasing, but also that the economic influence of Russia in the Central Asian region as a whole is steadily declining, due to more and more competition from China, but also from Turkey and, to a much lesser extent, Iran. Figures and data are not the only proof of this trend: in the whole region, markets, traditional bazaars and even common people's lifestyles are changing: the Chinese economic presence is becoming obvious even in the smallest and most remote villages in Central Asia, often allowing poor people to buy goods that they could not afford otherwise. Russia simply seems to lack the ability to hinder China's advance. The future looks even less bright for Moscow: agreements between China and Kazakhstan seek to raise bilateral trade to $40 billion by 2015, further strengthening China's foothold in Central Asia.
"Kazakh Ambassador to China Nurlan Ermekbayev stated that China was the largest foreign trade partner of Kazakhstan, underlining that the progressive development of bilateral cooperation remained one of the main priorities of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. He stressed that Kazakhstan had great potential to export coal, phosphate fertilizer, rolled metal and agricultural products to China".
In terms of economic relations, even more improvements can be expected. At the end of September, Chinese and Kazakh entrepreneurs met to discuss business between the two countries. The Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo, has taken advantage of the opportunity to talk about future cooperation opportunities in energy, mineral resources, roads and railway construction, metallurgy, telecommunications and agriculture; the Chairman has also emphasized the need to improve cooperation between companies and increase the amount of mutual investments. It is important to note that Bangguo has emphasized non-resources cooperation opportunities over simple energy cooperation: Kazakhstan needs to rapidly diversify its economy to shelter it from the risks related to depending on fluctuating oil and gas prices, and the support of a powerful partner like China would certainly help the country achieve its goals. It remains to be seen however, whether Chinese investments and cooperation would be actually used to promote economic diversification in Kazakhstan. Rather than relying on the amount of financial resources available, such a process of diversification depends on the political will of the Kazakh elite, which may not have a strong interest in diversifying after all: in fact, scarcely diversified economies that rely heavily on natural resources offer the best opportunity for political leaders to indulge in kleptocracy. It is Nazarbayev's civic-mindedness (or the lack of it) that will determine whether China's help will serve the interests of the country or, rather, the desires of the president's circle.
"...- China and Eurasia - Sino-Russian relations; China's strategy in Central Asia; energy and communication projects of China in the inner Eurasia".
Energy looms large in Kazakh-Chinese relations. Beijing views Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as an important element in its energy equation and hopes to obtain more and more resources from the region. Central Asia can help Beijing to diversify its energy supplies, reducing its dependence on the largest Middle Easters oil exporters, which provided China with more than two million barrels/day in 2010. Chinese officials are worried about political instability in the Middle East and the likelihood of the US closing the Strait of Malacca through which supplies, en route from the Middle East, must transit. These are, indeed, serious concerns. It is very likely, therefore, that China will continue increasing its oil and gas imports from Central Asia over the next years, potentially decades, guaranteeing the expansion of the energy sector in Central Asia's hydrocarbon- rich states. Moreover, Chinese purchases of Central Asian oil and gas provide the region not just with a massive source of income, but also with a powerful alternative to Russia as a transit country, increasing the political maneuvering space of the Central Asian governments. Astana is fully aware of these benefits and is accordingly doing its best to satisfy China's requests.
This is primarily due to the fact that by giving greater priority to friendly relations established with Russia, China recognized its natural sphere of influence in the region. Traditionally, international analyst groups perceived the Central Asian policy of China as a reflection of its desire to secure a "strategic rear". Accordingly, the region's importance in the hierarchy of Beijing's foreign policy was low. Great powers reserved the priority in the external contacts of Beijing, and bordering states, according to the official concept, remained in third place, after developing countries.
At the moment, Kazakhstan is one of China's main energy providers (11 million tons of oil reached China in 2010 through the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline), and Chinese officials visiting Central Asia have recently expressed their desire to strengthen energy cooperation with oil-rich Kazakhstan. The Central Asian country's oil exports are set to increase dramatically over the next years with Kazakh officials promising a 50% increase by 2020, and a large share of this will be used to meet China's growing demand: Kazakhstan's goal is to provide 22 million tons/year of oil to China by 2020, up from an estimated 12.1 million tons in 2011. To achieve this, Kazakhstan is working to increase the amount of oil delivered through the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, while constructing a parallel gas pipeline which should become operational in 2014. In addition to increasing Kazakhstan's gas exports, this new infrastructure would also fill a serious gap in Kazakhstan's pipelines network, enabling gas from the west of the country to be delivered to the industrial southern regions of Kazakhstan, consequently eliminating the reliance on Uzbek gas.
Hydrocarbons will definitely remain at the core of energy cooperation between Astana and Beijing. According to Chinese officials, however, cooperation should not be limited to oil and gas but should extend to clean energy as well. Nuclear energy cooperation has also been singled out as an important sector for cooperation: from 2011, Kazakhstan will begin exporting uranium to China. These developments seem beneficial for Kazakhstan: it needs new trading partners in order to exploit its huge resource potential and become one of the five largest oil producers in the World, but it is also committed to diversifying its economy, which investment in other sectors such as renewable energies helps it to achieve.
- http://kisi.kz/en/categories/geopolitics-and-international-affairs/posts/new-stage-of-kazakhstan-china-relations
- http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/en/last-news/2158-kazakhstan-and-china-discuss-geopolitical-situation-in-eurasia-and- bilateral-relations-in-beijing
- The policy of China at the present stage: Realities and Scientific publication. - Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005. - P. 9.
- Galyamova Central Asian vector of China policy and long-term impact of China on the security of the region. Kazakhstan and China: strategic partnership. - Almaty: IMEP, 2006. - 138 p. - P. 101-102.