Abstract. Methodologically, this analysis is the result of the study of the most upto-date research papers, books, and valuable articles of geopolitics as well as comments from prominent scholars. Recent official documents, officers’ evaluations as well as policy-makers’ statements constitute the core of this inquiry. Additionally, the paper modestly attempts to lay the foundations of a new theoretical framework. Indeed, Russian expansionism in the South Caucasus’ region is investigated through the lens of various Carl Schmitt’s concepts, e.g. «Groβraum» and «Nomos». In this regard, major thinkers like

1. Mackinder, N. Spykman and Z. Brzezinski will be mobilized in defence of Western engagement in the region. Therefore, the paper stresses the urge of a renewed realist policy by both the United States and the European Union toward S. Caucasus and the necessity for the three Republics to re-consider their disputes in order to benefit from far greater payoffs in all fields, included that of independence, otherwise at stake. Though only en passant, other actors are mentioned, e.g. Turkey and Iran, constantly involved in this littler “New Great Game.” In this context I assume the international system as anarchic, in which States, as T. Hobbes argues “are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators”.

Contents

• Abstract
• Short Introduction: main points. The West
• A West’s “Farwell Address”.
• Engagement remains critical: a geopolitical
  • Georgia’s struggle towards Euro-Atlantic
  • The only true independent country:

Russia

• Great Power, Great
• Carl Schmitt’s gloomy presence: its implications for S.
  • Armenia: Protect hence I oblige.
  • Of Nomos, conflicts and sovereignty: divide and 7 Conclusions 

“Geopoliticians are committed to the all-too-rare activity of putting things together”

Colin S. Gray, strategic thinker. 

1.     Abstract

Methodologically, this analysis is the result of the study of the most up-to-date research papers, books, valuable articles of geopolitics as well as comments from prominent scholars. Recent official documents, officers’ evaluations as well as policy-makers’ statements constitute the core of this inquiry. Additionally, the paper modestly attempts to lay the foundations of a new theoretical framework. Indeed, Russian expansionism in the South Caucasus’ region is investigated through the lens of various Carl Schmitt’s concepts, e.g. «Groβraum» and «Nomos». In this regard, major thinkers like

Mackinder, N. J. Spykman and Z. Brzezinski will be mobilized in defence of Western engagement in the region. Therefore, the paper stresses the urge of a renewed realist policy by both the United States and the European Union toward S. Caucasus and the necessity for the three Republics to reconsider their disputes in order to benefit from far greater payoffs in all fields, included that of independence, otherwise at stake. Though only en passant, other actors are mentioned, e.g. Turkey and Iran, constantly involved in this littler “New Great Game.” In this context I assume the international system as anarchic, in which States, as T. Hobbes argues “are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators”

2.     Short Introduction: the Region in pills

The South Caucasus’s strategic relevance has been recognized by the whole community of experts [1]. Nowadays, both Russia and the ideologically defined “West” have in the region growing, long-lasting and divergent interests. After the USSR’s collapse in 1991, the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia became full-fledged sovereign states. However, violence preceded and followed independence in the form of both ethno-territorial conflicts (i.e. Georgia vs. separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and interstate conflicts (i.e. Armenia vs. Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, since 1988). On August 8, 2008, the region experienced a 5-days-full-scale military war between the Rep. of Georgia and the Russian Federation, following an attempt to re-conquer the lost provinces by then-president M. Saakashvili. The war enhanced Russian military reforms. During these two decades, many promises about a further NATO enlargement occurred and attempts have been carried out to settle the various disputes. In this regard, the Minsk Group efforts toward the Nagorno-Karabakh and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia are worth mentioning. Nevertheless, results remain disappointing on the whole.

3.     A West’s “farewell address”?

Cornell, pointed out in 2004 that “the South Caucasus stands out as being the region with the most acute security deficit,” describing the newcomers as “weak” and with “unresolved territorial problems” [2]. In the article, the author depicts insecurity as the main source of political instability. However, at that time, there was widespread enthusiasm toward the region, which was clearly perceivable in Cornell’s words; a sentence is worth mentioning: “a larger role for the Alliance [NATO] in strengthening the security of the South Caucasus is warranted, and this realization is gradually being turned into practice.” The author also identified the US as West’s champion, able to enhance other hesitant states’ engagement in the South Caucasus. Cornell pinpoints the source of this “renewed focus [in the region]” in the tight connections between the growing security interests of NATO members in areas where spillovers, deriving from S. Caucasus’ instability, would have had disastrous consequences: i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ten years passed and enthusiasm disappeared. In 2014, Americanleading commentator Stephen Blank wrote about a “widespread feeling of abandonment by the United States” [3] and last year, S. Cornell denounced: “Western influence in the region is at an all-time low”. Key West’s summit in 2001 and G. Bush historic visit in Georgia in 2005, as well as 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest [4], now belong to memory. It seems the West forgot how crucial some of the accomplishments of last decade were, e.g. either the costly BTC oil pipeline or BTE gas pipeline, in strengthening region’s independence and West’s security. The literature on the S. Caucasus identifies the aggression of Georgia in August 2008 as the turning point in the decline of Western engagement. From that moment onward, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia experienced, in order, social unrest and human rights’ deterioration.

In addition, the closure of both OSCE mission (in South Ossetia) and UNOMIG (in both Abkhazia and Georgia) in 2008 and 2009 represented a further retreat. With international organization presence levelled to the ground, Strategist O. Antonenko notes the unfeasibility of “objective analysis...on developments [in Abkhazia]” [5]. Even the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) established in Ergneti and Gali in 2009, as a result of the Geneva Discussions [6], have been downsized for four years; while the former continued to operate [7], the latter was suspended in 2012 and only resumed to work last month [8]. As far as ArmeniaAzerbaijan conflict resolution is concerned, the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, US and France didn’t manage to provide effective political agreements to the age-old Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

In the same year, the Rep. of Armenia surrendered to Russian’s pressure, announcing it would have joined the Eurasian Economic Community while renouncing to sign a DCFTA with the EU. Armenia was an Eastern Partnership Program targeted-country, together with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine until few weeks before the Vilnius Summit on November 2013. Nevertheless, it’s withdrawn was followed by an unexpected recalcitrant behaviour on the part of Ukrainian Government: this was the stroke that broke the camel and triggered a revolution in the country. As stated by F. 

Hill and Al., though Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine-new government were in the end able to sign their respective DCFTAs, Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit can be considered a “debacle.” The summit which followed took place in Riga on May 2015, but it had the same fate, resulting in nothing concrete [9]. However, improvements took place as far as EU-Georgia Visa Liberalization Dialogue is concerned, especially after Commission’s acknowledgement of Georgian achievement of “all the benchmarks” [10].

To this day, a lack of strategic common view within both NATO members and European Union states toward S. Caucasus is intolerable. The consequences of such a conduct are well perceivable. In particular, as Chatham House’sAcademy Fellow George Mchedlisvhili recent contribution outlines, Western’s perception is changing in all three Republics [11]. Continuous promises of Euro-Atlantic integration, regularly disappointed, are frustrating Georgia’s long-standing pro-western stance while Armenia still overwhelmingly considers Russia its “biggest friend.” Azerbaijan’s disillusion has resulted from Western ineffective attempts to strengthen its security and territorial-integrity aspirations. In addition, further charges by the European Parliament toward Aliyev’s government about human rights’ abuses contributed to its alienation. Not by chance, this “finger-pointing” policy was recently included by S. Cornell among “serious mistakes” committed by Western policy-makers.

4.     Engagement remains critical: a Geopolitical view

To revert the aforementioned disengagement-process is a mandatory task. In this regard, Sir H. J. Mackinder’s “superior example of grand theory” is helpful [12]. Indeed, Mackinder’s suggestion that the polity in control of the Pivot/Heartland, i.e. “the greatest natural fortress on earth,” would have had enough strength to command the World-Island and then the World has an eternal value. The same position was echoed by British-American leading Strategist Colin S. Gray, “it is a timeless truth that great peril to the West can come only from Eurasia”. Between the two, Z. Brzezinski’s words are likewise emblematic: “all of the potential...challengers to American primacy are Eurasian” [13]. In this regard, both aggression of Georgia, coercion of Armenia, as well as the illegal annexation of Crimea and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty confirm their concerns.

Now as then, I assume the very objective of Western powers to form a counterweight to the “Heartland state or coalition”. This view was endorsed by strategic advisor P. Wolfowitz. He was influenced by Mackinder’s writings when postulated its own doctrine: i.e. “to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power” [14], namely the S. Caucasus and Central Asia. In The Great Chessboard, then-National Security Advisor,

Brzezinski clearly supposed what in the end happened. In his words: “if the middle space (e. Russia) rebuffs the West, becomes an assertive single entity, and either gains control over the South or forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor, then America’s primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically”.

American-Dutch Geostrategist’s lesson that of N. J. Spykman, is worth mentioning. He firmly believed, unlike Mackinder, that being in control of the Rimland was critical to the point that “who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia control the destinies of the world” [15]. His grand-theory relied on one pillar: “the struggle for a balance of power should be considered permanent” [16]. This approach collides with Fukuyama’s narrative of a presumed post-Cold-War end of History, where Liberal democracy constitutes the “final form of human government” [17]. Moreover, Spykman “required his readers to seek the longer term meaning of contemporary events”, something that Obama’s “case-by-case approach” disregarded [18]. Besides, what both Brzezinski and Mackinder said in different times about preventing Heartland’s single or joint control by hostile powers, is findable in Spykman’s thought too, but from a Rimland’s perspective.

Despite their differences, these authors’ suggestions are equally critical to awaken Western powers’ interest towards S. Caucasus; especially if we take into consideration Walter R. Mead’s contribution on Foreign Affairs. In his article, The Return of Geopolitics, the author states that while US and EU “would move past geopolitical questions of territory and military power” other up-to-date “geostrategic players”, borrowing Brzezinski’s terminology, like China, Russia and Iran “are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn “[the post-Cold War geopolitical order]” [19]. This view was shared by NATO secretary general who, speaking about Russian’s aggressive behaviour, underscored that “[Russia] is trying to re-establish a system of spheres of influence” [20]. This theme is widely discussed later on.

1.       Georgia’s struggle towards Euro-Atlantic integration

In Mackinder and Spykman’s views, Georgia would be placed at the Heartland’s periphery. Because of this key position, once again using Brzezinski’s vocabulary, it raises to the rank of “geostrategic pivot”. Indeed, despite its lack of hydrocarbons, Tbilisi managed to exploit its geographical location to strengthen its natural role of “transport route to the West for oil and natural gas” [21]. In addition to this, its geopolitical role is bolstered by the perspective of a foreseeable “China-Europe land trade,” wherefrom EU’s economic-champion, i.e. Germany, could enormously take advantage,

Blank suggests. Therefore, it is a mandatory task to prevent Georgia’s proWestern stance to shrink. In this regard, as recently argued by Professor M. Tsereteli, Georgia’s requests for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) “should be welcomed” [22], since “prospect of NATO membership,” echoes analyst

Dzebiashvili, “offers much better prospects for consolidating [even] democratic gains” [23].

In addition, thanks to its morphology, Georgia is easier to defend if compared with Eastern NATO members. Though it’s true that Georgian military power is the weakest of the region [24], it should be said that Georgia cannot count upon neither an external free-charge weapons provider (like Armenia does), nor oil-gas incomes (like Azerbaijan). Indeed, not even the ongoing illegal occupation of its territory, pushed the USA to provide Georgian government with “high-end military defensive weapons,” as then-EUCOM Commander, J. G. Stavridis explained answering senator J. McCain question on this matter [25]. Yet, Georgia’s failure in obtaining anti-tank batteries as well as air-defence systems was interpreted by Putin as a sign of West’s “deference”. However, I commenced defining Georgia a “geopolitical pivot”. Because of this status, Brzezinski’s suggestions are mandatory: “protecting them (geopolitical pivots), is...a crucial aspect of America’s (I would say West) global geo-strategy”.

Georgia’s cooperation with NATO proved commendable in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Still today, Georgia’s contributes to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), launched to replace the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with 870 troops [26]; this number is second only to the United States among the 40 contributor countries. In 2015 Georgian troops were involved in major exercises like BALTOPS-15, Agile Spirit 2015 and took service within the NATO’s Response Force. The country is also part of several joint-mechanisms, i.e. the NATO-Georgia commission, the Military Committee with Georgia, NATO Liason Office and the discussion’s framework Annual National Programme [27]. Moreover, since NATO Wales summit, in September 2014, Georgia has access to the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and was offered a Substantial-NATO Georgia Package, thus benefiting from NATO’s Defence Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI). The latter enabled the creation of a Joint Training and Evaluation Centre, a Defence Institution Building and Logistics Facility “to facilitate the reception and movement of NATO and Partner forces”.

Nevertheless, as stated by G. Menabde, Georgian’s leadership doesn’t believe that MAP could be substituted by other forms of cooperation [28]. In this regard, M. Tsereteli’s suggested strategy seems sound: i.e. NATO must formally declare “that Georgia can be admitted to NATO without a MAP”. Unfortunately, very recently, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow stressed Georgia’s necessity to “go through a Membership Action Plan (MAP) phase” before joining the Alliance [29]. The case of Montenegro strengthens this view. Therefore, the awaited NATO Summit in Warsaw (July 2016), is likely to lose the great opportunity of sending a strong message to Russia, instead confirming its conviction that the West will not protect, despite empty words, Georgia’s sovereignty. To this author, this will produce a domino effect.

2.       The only “true independent country”: Azerbaijan.

1. Brzezinski considered Azerbaijan to be the sole geostrategic pivot in the South Caucasus. If Azerbaijan fell into Russia’s hands, he argued, even Central Asian states’ independence would be meaningless. More recently, Dr. Robert M. Cutler echoed this position identifying Azerbaijan’s importance in “its irreplaceable role as a bridge from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea basin and Europe” [30]. Exactly the same view was expressed in 2009 by CEMTPP’s Director at Columbia University Albert Bressand [31]. Thanks to its wise “combined strategy of foreign involvement and pipeline diversification” [32], Azerbaijan managed throughout the years to maintain a balanced independent stance vis-à-vis foreign Great Powers: i.e. Russia and USA. In particular, projects like the oil-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (1 Mbl/d) and the gas-South Caucasus Pipeline (18,6 Mcm/d), online since May 2006 and March 2007 respectively, marked turning points in very recent Azerbaijani history.

Thanks to the BTC pipeline, Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli’s fields’ oil output was completely absorbed and exported, without Russian harmful influence [33]. However, what is crucial to Western energy security, as R. Cutler notes, is natural gas rather than crude oil. In this regard, according to SOCAR’s statistics, 66 bcm of gas and 17 million tons of condensate were produced from the Shah Deniz-1 project until November 1, 2015; British Petroleum owning a share of 28,8% in operating the field [34]. Furthermore, the development of Shah Deniz-2, whom full-fledged operability is expected to be completed in 2019, reaching a production of 39-48 Bcm/y is of uttermost importance [35]. In fact, after receiving Shah Deniz Consortium’s godsend in 2013 over Nabucco-West, the TAP project is expected to deliver natural gas to Italy, i.e. Europe. This route, being linked to the TANAP pipeline, stretching from Georgian-Turkish border to the Turkish-Bulgarian border, assumes greater geopolitical significance.

It “answers many Azerbaijani as well as European interests” argues Blank, i.e. it renews Turkmenistan’s interest towards a Trans-Caspian Pipeline, strengthens Georgia’s geostrategic position and Europe’s interest in its security, makes Turkey a true hub country directly linked to Azerbaijan and allows the country to invest into infrastructure projects of direct interest for European energy security. Indeed, half of the TAP’s planned-capacity of 20 Bcm/y, wisely notes A. Bohr in its very recent contribution, combined with an expanded South Caucasus Pipeline (BTE) and a sufficient TANAP’s capacity, could be used to transport Turkmen gas to Turkey, thereby to Europe. Though chances in that direction are few, the author specifies, “possibility cannot be ruled out” [36].

As some commentators note, the eventual “throughput of gas will be small relative to Russians exports” [37], as TAP’s capacity (350-700 bcf) will satisfy at best 2-4% of EU’s consumption. However, the eventual uninterrupted flow of Caspian gas either through the AGRI project or TANAP+TAP compels the West to tighten relationships with Azerbaijan. In this regard, unfortunately, OSCE Minsk Group’s inactivity in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, according to Eurasian foreign affairs and Policy Defense expert J. C. K. Daly, pushed the country to move closer toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where on last March, 14, it obtained the “dialogue partner” status [38]. As C. Gray suggests, Spykman’s thought defines the balance of power in Eurasia not as an Hegelian development of history, but rather as a struggle, a “continuous and prudent effort” to use his words. Because of this, the very recent Eurasian shift on the part of Azerbaijan combined with an ongoing deterioration in relations with both EU and US should lead Western leaders to at least reconsider their positions.

In the end it should be noted that, as the situation in the Middle East is far from being settled, such a conduct put at stake a renewed use of the Azerbaijan-Georgia route, which proved critical for military supply and logistic support of troops in Afghanistan. The conclusions will clarify this point.

5.  Great Power, great military: Russia

Thirteen years ago, J. Mearsheimer argued that Russia was in a position of “relative weakness” [39]. Nowadays, Western powers should recognize its renewed status of “potential hegemon” and adamantly deal with it. Yet, Putin himself warned the West on December the 30th, 1999, “It is too early to bury Russia as a great power” [40]. Facts proved he was right. However, as stated by French Russia’s specialist P. Marchand, Russia’s technological delay was “inquiétant” at that time, thus justifying similar Western perceptions. Indeed, Yeltsin’s distrust towards the army halved its effective strength between 1992 and 1996 [41].

Marchand’s volume, Atlas Géopolitique de la Russie, touches a key point: Putin’s reordering of domestic authority, which I consider necessary to its neo-imperial goals. Though it was E. Primakov, in September 1998, who firstly spoke about re-establishing a strong central power, six years later, in October 2004, after the Beslan School Siege, all Russian governors were nominated by the Kremlin. In between, V. Putin was elected, Federal Districts within the territory established, Governors were removed from the Senate (position which gave them immunity) and a new Fiscal Code was adopted. Recalling Brzezinski’s aforementioned “middle space,” it is clear that it virtually coincides with Russian borders, thus being “an assertive single entity” would basically mean from a Russian perspective, to reaffirm control over its own territory. After this process was achieved, the Kremlin, assisted by rising oil and gas prices, preceded in a major modernization of its armed forces.

A key point in this transformation process was the 2009-amendment to the Law on Defence. It allowed deployment of troops abroad, among other reasons, to protect Russian citizens. If we consider what S. Blank defines “passaportization-policy” [42], the consequences are immediately clear. Then, in 2012, outline K. Giles and A. Monaghan, Putin subordinated the Chief of General Staff directly to himself as Commander-in-Chief, rather than to the Minister of Defence [43]. Despite changes at the head of the latter, the last one being S. Shoygu, the whole military transformation can be considered a Putin reform, divided into different periods. Moreover, Russia’s obsession of a US-NATO attack was certainly exacerbated by the limited intervention in Libya, thus enhancing the modernization effort, which is taking today 8 years.

Nowadays, as Steven Pifer summarised, the current Kremlin’s effort towards military-modernization involves strategic nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear and conventional forces. In the first case, Russia is currently procuring 8 Borey-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) as well as 400 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In the second one, Pifer identifies a “particular concern” in the Russian development of low-yield nuclear weapons, especially if considered under the gloomy light of Russian de-escalation doctrine [44]. In the end, though limitations (limited number of professionals and “dumb bombs”), conventional capabilities are expected to improve, thus meeting “Russia’s foreign policy aims”. However, the whole program “came under pressure” following Western sanctions which slowed down the pace of reforms [45].

Finally, the Kremlin produced an up-to-date Military Doctrine in 2014 and a National Security Strategy in 2015. These two documents are worth briefly analyzing. As far as the former is concerned, Sinovets and Renz immediately get to the point underlying that its core consists in the Westward message that Russia is firmly committed in defending its “sphere of vital interest,” i.e. the former Soviet area [46]. In this regard, military exercises and military mobilization in its neighbourhood are ascribed to the category of military threats [47]. Others, e.g. the “overthrow of legitimate public authorities” as well as US-Prompt Global Strike represent military dangers, potentially becoming a threat. Besides, within an “increase[ed] global competition,” the Doctrine identifies NATO and its enlargement as the main foe. Beyond worrying about West’s harmful influence in Eurasia, the latter document is relevant as it reminds Russia’s long-term interest of being acknowledged as “one of the world’s great powers” [48].

6. Carl Schmitt’s gloomy presence: its implications for Caucasus. Carl Schmitt’s political thought, in particular what concerns its internationalist writings is crucial to this research. In this regard, Professor Stefan Auer brilliantly gathered the “common tendencies between Schmitt’s arguments and the salient characteristic of the contemporary Russian state” [49]. In his article, the author deals with the concepts of Groβraum,

Sovereignty, Nomos etc. in relation to the Ukrainian’s crisis. However, the same rationale, with the due adjustments can be applied to the South Caucasus with no exception.

To this author, Carl Schmitt can be considered the fiercest opponent of what D.M. Jones and M.L.R. Smith termed a “universal normative orientation” [50]. Throughout his whole life, Schmitt opposed the concept of West, i.e. the contrary of the «Jus Publicum Europaeum». In the Nomos of the Earth, he charged the United States, a sea-power, as bearer of a universalistic ideology which, undermining the very essence of the Political (distinction between friend and enemy), covered “[its] particular political interests with a cloak of morality” [51]. V. Putin is currently the figure who, striding the world stage, holds the banner of Schmitt’s conceptual arsenal against, chiefly, the Spykmanesque-development followed by NATO: i.e. the containment of Heartland-Russia from and with the Rimland.

As Schmitt’s before him, V. Putin’s narrative about Russian “NearAbroad” and “vital spheres of interest” are nothing but an attempt to develop and concretize, probably the most western of the idea: the Monroe Doctrine, dating back 1823. Within this area of American special interests, the old, corrupted Europeans were not allowed. The same logic can be found in Russian’s rhetoric about its traditional values. A key strategic-document, as the aforementioned 2015 National Security Strategy for example, marks a significant step forward in this sense. CSIS’s Director of Russia and Eurasia Program, Olga Oliker, dedicates a paragraph to this issue in her article, arguing that these values are, for the Kremlin, in need of protection, especially from foreign cultural products. In Schmitt’s opinion, the Monroe Doctrine possessed an extremely “defensive-character” and worked as “a protest against further European appropriation of American soil.” The reader substitute European with NATO and American with Russian and everything becomes clear.

Now, one may argue that Russian’s soil doesn’t comprehend South Caucasus. However, poetry comes to my assistance. “От Нила до Невы, от Эльбы до Китая/От Волги по Евфрат, от Ганга до Дуная…” says F.Tytchev’s stanza, in identifying the borders of Russian tsardom. Then again, Tsar Alexei’s minister Nashchokin’s definition of foreign policy: i.e. “expanding the state in every direction”, [52] brilliantly brought to the light by Henry Kissinger in one of his last contribution. This two examples, to this author, are quite explicative of Russian’s historical mindset and I state this without condemn. Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine, as that of Putin as it emanates from its foreign policy’s conduct, possess a concrete/political character. The former, acknowledged the mortal threat represented by the European Monarchies which, once defeated Napoleon, tried to restore the Ancièn Regime [53]. The latter, considers NATO-enlargement the main foe, a matter potentially threatening a war, as 2014 Military Doctrine states.

Within the Western Hemisphere, concrete command was entitled to the United States; every event had to be read in relation to their interests. The same ambition as far as Ukraine and the South Caucasus in particular belongs to Russia; in this regard, Keir Giles and Andrew Monaghan get to the critical point, though probably unconsciously, when they note that: “the notion that Russia can be ignored is in it felt as threatening”. However, Western’s line overreached its geographical boundaries, pretended to be the Universalism and resorted the “worst atrocities” of religious wars, conducting a «bellum justum» towards its enemies, Schmitt tells us. Instead, neo-Imperial Russia, which is not anymore ideologically-driven as the USSR was, heads towards the creation of a Groβraum: i.e. a broader space in which, a “predominant power” conducts a hegemonic existence [54]. Though the Reich (read Russia) doesn’t correspond with Groβraum’s borders, points out C. Galli, it needs it together with a “number of subjected nations” [55]. In the end, the Groβraum’s foreign policy is directly shaped by the hegemon. If the United States has been a quasi-Großraum with Monroe, modern Russia is to this author performing well towards this goal.

Now, I shall consider different aspects of the South Caucasus through Schmitt’s categories.

6.1  Armenia: Protect hence I oblige

The coercion exercised by the Kremlin towards Armenia to join the Customs Union and then the Eurasian Union, despite no common border with other members, are symptomatic of this attitude. Armen Grigoryan provides an in depth-analysis of this process, which involved: gas price rises, economic retaliations against Armenian exports and Armenian citizens working in Russia, increased provision of weapons to Azerbaijan etc. etc. It’s no coincidence that, as the author reports, fervent Schmitt’s estimator Alexander Dugin, shamefully prospected Armenia a sad dilemma, i.e. “Customs Union membership or bloodshed and disappearance from the map” [56]. It’s noteworthy that S. Auer, in his aforementioned article, also discusses Dugin’s ideology of Eurasia in connection with C. Schmitt’s Groβraum.

While Armenians, interviewed by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers in 2012, asked to indicate their country’s biggest friend, overwhelmingly answered Russia (86%), the most up-to-date source on military issues underscores how the “overall [Armenian] military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking”. Beyond the EEU, Armenia is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which is seen by many policy makers, e.g. President Sargisyan and Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian, as compelled to protect the country in the case of Azerbaijan’s attack. In these days, CSTO-Chief Nikolay Bordyuzha even acknowledged the possibility of a large-scale conflict [57]. As of early 2016, 3,300 Russian troops are stationing in Gyumri’s base (leased until 2044), equipped with T-72, BMP-1, BMP-2 and BM-21. Instead, air defense is assured by 1 fighter squadron with MiG-29 Fulcrum, SAM battery with S-300V and SAM battery with 2k12 Kub.

Carl Schmitt’s famous motto “protego ergo obligo” which he used to captures the essence of the sovereign state, perfectly represents the very core of Russian-Armenian relations [58]. Moreover, in July 2015, the Russian Federation and the Armenian government signed an agreement granting the small country a loan of 200 mln. dollars, aimed at purchasing modern weapons from Russia between 2015 and 2017, thus significantly bolstering the arms race between Yerevan and Baku whose implications are, in these days, turning tragic. In this regard, hypothesis was also advanced about Montenegro being used to deliver weapons covertly to Nagorno-Karabakh thanks to PodgoricaStepanakert’s air-route [59]. Academy Fellow Anahit Shirinyan properly stressed the recent re-opening of EU-Armenia negotiations on 7 December 2015, followed by the meeting between EU Diplomacy’s Chief Federica Mogherini and Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Nalbandian on March the 1st [60], coupled with the lift of USA’s sanctions towards Iran as opportunities to “recalibrate its relationship with Moscow” [61].

However, C. Schmitt’s Groβraum is built upon a pillar: «Intervention Verbot für rumfremde Machte», i.e. it is committed in keeping out foreign powers at any cost and from every field. To this purpose, Gazprom extorted a monopoly of 30 years on Armenia’s gas Distribution Network in 2013 and it traditionally looked askance Iranian ambitions to connect the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea through its northern neighbors (Georgia and Armenia), [62] emblematic was Russian success in halving the ArmenianIranian pipeline in 2005, preventing the possibility of Iranian Gas reaching the European soil [63]. Armenia is currently importing 76,4% of gas from Russia, it doesn’t possess natural resources and its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain and will remain closed, at least in the foreseeable future. This total dependence from the Kremlin-led organizations as well as military protection confines the country within Russian’s Groβraum.

6.2  Of Nomos, conflicts and sovereignty: divide and conquer

Step by step the reader should be able to combine puzzle’s pieces. Chatham House’s Associate Fellow J. Sherr in his recent book argued that “Putin’s Russia has revived the Tsarist and Soviet view that sovereignty is a contingent factor depending on power, culture, and historical norms, not an absolute and unconditional principle of world politics” [64]. In this regard, this Schmitt’s excerpt should sound at least disquieting:

Every order of international law must guarantee, if it does not disavow itself, not the given status quo of a particular historical moment, with all its many details and more or less contingent circumstances, but rather its fundamental Nomos – its spatial structure, the unity of order and orientation [65].

Beyond the striking Crimean case, the Kremlin is carrying out a real «Landnahme», i.e. a “process of order and orientation that is based on firm land and establishes law” in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This process is conducted by the master form of politics: military power. Indeed, according to the influential Military Balance 2016, Russian troops deployed in the two territories account for a total of 7,000 men. The whole number is divided among two military bases, one per territory. Each of these bases hosts a military brigade. That of Gudauta can count upon 40 T-90A, 120 BTR-82A, 12 2S12; 18 BM-21 and some S-300 SAM as well as Attack Helicopters. As far as Djava/Tskhinvali is concerned, base’s military equipment comprehends: 40 T-72, 120 BMP-2, 36 2S3; 12 2S12. Furthermore, as J. Nichol’s in-depth analysis pointed out, Russian troops deployed, along the illegally detached-regions and Georgian borders, trenches, fences and mines.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia are far from being only “Russia’s zone of influence” as Dimitri Trenin defined them. Instead, they represent, together with Crimea, the proof that what is obvious for us: human rights, sovereignty, security, are constantly at stake. In my opinion, key words of the aforementioned Schmitt’s excerpt are: “contingent circumstances.” With his disturbing but genial way of debate, Schmitt reminds us the groundlessness of Modernity’s pillars. This was the very significance of the concept of Nomos, greatly grasped by Lawyer and Scholar W. Hooker:

The Nomos of the Earth is intended to convey the conditional and temporally fragile order of things in the world, which, despite this sense of contingency, nevertheless exists as a concrete reality.

This “fragile order of things” is now stormed by geopolitical ambitions of the most revisionist power: Russia. The simple fact that History developed in a certain way, does not imply it was a necessity: it could have gone differently. South Caucasus’ experience, coupled with highly plausible concerns by leading security specialists such as Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon about US-NATO’s readiness to deter “Russian threat to the Alliance, particularly in its eastern members” require particular attention [66].

Of course, the wrong-defined-category of “frozen-conflicts” remains in the end instrumental to Russian’s divided and conquers strategy. In this regard, political analyst Vladimir Socor labelled Kremlin’s policy towards these conflicts as “controlled instability” [67]. This state of flux represents the ideal ground on which exerting Schmitt understands of sovereignty as the power to decide on the exceptional case, imposing order “at the point of which law ends”. Indeed, lack of progress in conflict resolution prevented any form of regional cooperation, permanently leaving region’s stability at stake. In this regard, prominent strategist O. Antonenko explicitly included cooperation among other “key challenges” to address the region. In particular, the author underlines, further integration within the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation and OSCE is recommended. Nevertheless, as Matteo Verda points out, South-Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh belong to the category of “intractable conflicts”, i.e. a sub-category of international conflicts, characterized by conflict traps, interconnectivity, issue polarization and malignant system. All this prevents progresses, though risk for escalation remains high: recent events confirm.

Apropos Karabakh, the Kremlin didn’t limit itself to providing Armenia with loans and weapons, strengthening its bilateral relationship etc. as I proved evidence above; it also continuously and deliberately sold modern weapons to Azerbaijan for a total value exceeding 4 billion dollars, specialists report [68]. On March 23, Dr. Avinoam Idan as part of a Central Asia-Caucasus Institute/Silk Road Studies Program conference’s panel, not only came to the same conclusion as did V. Socor and others, but exactly foreseen, because of “[an increased] reinforcing of Russian troops in Armenia, including combat helicopters...the conflict to erupt once again” [69]. All this despite the even though high considerable opinion of

1. De Waal who insists in “Armenia and Azerbaijan [being] the primary actors” with Russia, though high influential, not able to pull the strings [70]. Two years ago, writing on Foreign Affairs, De Waal defined the “[then]most dangerous flare-up of violence...in 20 years” as a “pure Armenian– Azerbaijani war of bluff that got out of hand” [71]. This is a reasonable position, but Kremlin’s behavior in S. Caucasus overwhelms in the opinion of this author, that of other parties, Turkey and Iran included.

7. Conclusions and suggestions

Though the West is certainly in a phase of “retreat,” there are plenty reasons to change. To this end, an incisive contribution comes from American leading Strategists J.J. Grygiel and A.W. Mitchell. In their last fatigue, The Unquiet Frontier, they underline the role of “alliances” in granting USA, thus Western’s interests. The rationale of their work applies to our research in at least two ways. Firstly, widely echoing or directly mentioning both Mackinder and Spykman’s works, they identify “defensive alliances” as being able to deter aggression, reverting the common idea that alliances might be “most valuable after a war breaks out.” Backed by two important studies [72], they prove a “strong correlation between the existence of alliances…and the effectiveness of deterrence” [73]. Because of this, Georgia should enter into NATO as soon as possible: once in, Article 5 would provide the required deterrent to avoid a new 2008 War-style.

Secondly, alliances act as power projections tools; in the authors as well as Spykman’s view this means “being physically present in these regions, [where] alliances [provide] reliable places from which…ships, troops and planes can deploy”. In this regard, S. Cornell directly spoke of “permanent military presence in the Caucasus”. Geopolitically speaking, a Groβraum could easily degenerate, as the Monroe Doctrine and Nazi expansionism confirm. Because of this, military bases could prevent further swallow-up of territories. Emblematic are Georgian Minister of Defence’s concerns about Russia: “a question of life or death for Georgia” [74]. Besides this, pro-Russian sentiments are taking momentum in Georgia; analyst Tracey German perceived Irakli Alasiana’s sacking as a sign of this [75]. Instead, Michael Cecire grasped the reciprocal hate between Georgian Dream and United National Movement as instrumental to Russia’s intrusion in domestic affairs [76]. Last but not least, Stephen Blank worried about recent opening by the Georgian government to Gazprom, defined “complicit in Russia’s imperial design”.

A NATO peacekeepers deployment in Karabakh could be an interesting idea, anticipating an eventual and irreversible similar Russian solution: with all its harmful implications. To this end, it is critical to recover West’s lost reputation in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Direct negotiations with both leaders on this issue have to begin, taking into consideration even the possibility to bypass the whole OSCE Minsk process whose utility is doubtful. Svante Cornell suggests a combined effort by the White House and EU institutions: the former is expected “to take the lead on the political side,” while the latter “in organizing an international development program for the currently occupied Azerbaijani provinces and Karabakh itself”. To this author, direct negotiations with Azerbaijan, by leading-Western figures, could satisfy Aliyev’s demands of attention towards his country’s territorial integrity, slowing down his aggressive stance vis-à-vis the Karabakh conflict and enhancing the chances of being involved in a tailored EU’s Eastern Partnership program, as S. Cornell himself underlines.

At the end of this path, the reader has been through several concepts and analysis. However, what remained constant are the elements which will continue to shape countries’ geopolitical interests: the Land and the Sea. Both the authors and the actors of this inquiry are naturally linked to them: the West, Mackinder, Spykman and Brzezinski on the Sea’s side and Russia, the Caucasus and Schmitt on the Land’s side; the resulting tension is primordial and will last forever. For this reason, Goethe’s maxim “Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht/Only Sea and Land count here” which opens the Nomos of the Earth, capturing its intimate meaning, brings the curtain down over this work of geopolitics.

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