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International relations & sovereign wealth funds: the strategic role of china Investment Corporation

In any study contemporary International Relations it is critical to take into account the states' economic development and the influence on the elite's perception of the role of outbound direct investments (GDI). 

Since the late 1970s, China's staggering economic growth has been a major driving force that has led the country to become the world's second largest economy, after the United States. At the present, while some developing countries have been inspired by China's so-called "Market Socialism" [1, p.15], others look at the PRC with ill-concealed fear, and China's expansion model for its soft power faces many social, political and diplomatic challenges.

The Chinese sovereign wealth fund (SWF) China Investment Corporation (CIC) [2, p.25] is posed to contribute not only to China's economic international expansion but also, given the widening of the global market, could reinforce the notion of market socialism as a workable model. Before the global downturn, few questioned the liberal, democratic Western trade model. Meanwhile China has quickly transformed itself into an active player not only in financial affairs, but also in the competition for energy resources and raw materials, in an age where both are becoming increasingly scarce. The role sovereign funds (SWFs) play extends well beyond the specifics of financial gains and returns. The movements of capital generated represent pawns in a larger game, which operates simultaneously on economic and political fronts, both domestically and internationally.

Ultimately the SWFs financial moves are perceived by the country, in which the investment is made, as an external influence on domestic affairs.

SWFs are a preferential investment instrument set up by a government, the aim of which being the acquisition of international financial resources to make a high gain. Consequently they are mainly composed of foreign exchange reserves. The most well known sovereign wealth funds are usually controlled directly by the Central banks of those countries that have accumulated wealth over time thanks to several concomitant factors, ranging from the trade surplus (especially for petroleum and gas producing nations) [3, p.35] to the presence of an efficient financial system, such as in the case of Singapore. There are several other types of government funds that strictly speaking are not identified as sovereign wealth funds in that they are fed by state savings made by the various departments under the control of the Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance. SWFs themselves are subdivided by the multiplicity of purposes they were created for, these range from the need of some countries to stabilise the volatility of capital generated by a trade surplus, to those in which the SWF revenue is used as the primary source for long term domestic development policies.

This multiplicity of objectives, as well as the different modes by which they are implemented, makes it difficult to draw up a single model that can be used for their definition. The de facto common nominator of this plurality is the function for which they are created, namely the return on investment with the aim of generating high profits. From a technical point of view the distinction is usually made between foreign exchange sovereign wealth funds and those in other assets. This distinction is also based on the times required for the remuneration of the invested capital, short-term and long-term respectively.

The recent arrival on the world scene of sovereign wealth funds, especially in the last five years, is moving the dynamic equilibrium of economic power from the economies of the OECD countries towards BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Middle East. [4, p.45] This rebalance is not devoid of significance; it underlines the political importance of a shift in economic power from democratic liberal countries to those that are distinguished by new forms of authoritarian capitalism. In this way the young emerging economies, especially, those tied to the export of energy, see the prospect of being able to emerge on the world stage as primary actors and not merely as passive spectators, as has mainly been the case in the past.

Thus it is easy to imagine how the growing importance of investments made by SWFs internationally is creating one of the major controversies of global finance [5, p.55], one reason being that now it is the more industrialised countries who are the target outbound direct investments (GDIs) and hostile takeovers by the funds of developing nations. A completely new situation that questions the consolidated leadership of the Western countries, something that is also expressed in the majority presence at the top of the very organisations that should guarantee balance and transparency, as well as effective equal opportunities for the various countries. Furthermore it is interesting to note that, as the very consequence of a still deepseated imbalance of power in favour of the Western economies, these organisations often express exclusively the point of view of one side, also for mechanisms that we could define as implicitly ethnocentric. Actually, what is happening cannot be interpreted as simply a substantial power rebalancing; at most, understandably, it could be ascribed to the harbingers of a new situation, worries about one's own future can lead to the incorrect interpretation of some signals or to taking decisions dictated more by fear than reality, with the consequent introduction of protectionist policies. In this case one of the greatest risks for the stability and equilibrium of IR and world finance is represented by the fear that the OECD countries may react irrationally by implementing protectionist policies. In other words, the countries that are becoming increasingly important from an objective point of view for their growing weight on global finance find that they do not have access to the international organisations.

The role of sovereign wealth funds, or their nature as instruments tied to one country and, consequently, to its strategies of international legitimisation, lies at the intersection of the economic area with that of an exclusively political domain. [6, p.33] As in all cases generated by new processes and economic systems, there is the need for international regulations. [7, p.75] At the moment, as sovereign wealth funds are bound only by the market rules, there are particular contradictions in their action in foreign countries and in their political significance; frequently they are without any form of transparency. As irony would have it, at present it is the crisis of the American financial system that, fanning out into European countries, is increasing the room for manoeuvre of sovereign wealth funds making them much broader and incisive, given that the major financial reserves are being redistributed in Asia and the Arab countries. One of the first examples of a sovereign wealth fund came from the Kuwait Investment Authority, set up in 1953 for the management of revenue deriving from oil sales after gaining independence from Great Britain. Pre 2007 crisis the main SWFs number no more than around twenty, with total assets amounting to US$2,876 trillion in 2007 which, compared to the US$1.35 trillion accumulated before the financial meltdown by the major hedge funds, gives a good idea of the potential influence they have on the global economy.

According to recent estimates among the funds with the greatest availability of resources are the UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (US$773 billion), the Government Pension Fund of Norway (US$893 billion), the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIG US$320 billion), the China Investment Corp (CIC US$652 billion), Singapore's Temasek Holdings (US$177 billion) [8, p.85]. The estimate amount of the total assets by the world SWFs amounts to US$ 6,830 billion with more than 60% of the total generated by trade in oil and natural resources.

From the point of view of their influence, a first taste of the potentiality of the sovereign wealth funds as a vehicle of investment came in 2007 during the first signs of the financial crisis. Following the high exposure towards American subprime mortgages, investment banks such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch found themselves looking desperately for liquidity to guarantee their own survival, and the US$69 billion made available at the end of 2007 by the sovereign wealth funds of Kuwait, South Korea and Singapore played a particularly visible role in this kind of rescue operation. Throughout 2008 there was a succession of financial bailouts with particular attention to the banking and insurance sector. The entry into play of funds linked to nations within the share structure of international banks raised political fears in Europe and the United States, but, on the other hand, worries concerning the magnitude and the duration of the crisis considerably reduced the voices of those against. Only a few months before, in the absence of problematic situations, both Australia and the United States had blocked the investments of Chinese state companies in the mining and oil sectors, frightened by a fully-fledged foreign invasion, despite the fact that the would-be buyers were business corporations and not only "dangerous" sovereign wealth funds.

Another factor of instability in IR could be ascribed by the hedge funds (HF), a private version of the SWF, that represent a high risk private investment portfolio, whose strategies of seeking a high return are based on the use of financial leverages through the negotiation of swaps and other complex financial instruments that encompass the now infamous use of derivatives, futures and quantum trading. Hedge funds operate both on domestic and international markets and saw the zenith of their notoriety at the turn of the twenty-first century. Access to hedge funds is available only to companies or private individuals who have large amounts to invest for periods exceeding one year. The feature of these funds lies in the fact that they are not regulated by specific legislation. For example, in the United States the lack of laws for regulating hedge fund operations and for protecting investors is justified by the presumption that the investors who participate in hedge funds, in addition to disposing of an annual income of at least $1 million, know the market and its related risks well. At the same time the biggest trading banks utilize proprietary platforms called "dark pools" that operate in a grey legal area. Hedge funds were born following the same concept as denamely that of protecting and insuring a determined investment in the long term. Recently, however, the defensive aspect of the financial lever has been overturned in favour of a highly sophisticated and aggressive investment strategy, and hedge funds have been transformed into forms of high-risk investment.

Already in the late 1990s we witnessed several striking bankruptcies: from the case of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) Hedge Fund, whose rescue by the US Federal Reserve gave the first warning shots of the imminent financial crisis, to the biggest Wall Street fraud, that led to the arrest of the financier Madoff [9, p.95].. The LTCM fund traded using automated information systems, specially developed by two Nobel laureates for economics, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, generating average annual returns of over 40%. However the mathematical models of the two Nobel prize winners did not manage to take into account the Russian financial crisis at the end of the millennium and the fund, starting from 1998, began to notch up losses at a rate of hundreds of millions of US dollars a month, and failed in 2000. To try to remediate the US$4.7 billion losses in 1998 alone a further US$124 billion was injected and used as a financial lever for a total of US$1.2 trillion. However these funds proved to be insufficient to cover the exponential losses accumulated by LTCM which, with its closure in 2000, left all the private financiers dangerously short of liquid assets and also created a dangerous moral precedence, for the use made by the American government of public funds to save a purely private financial instrument. The main financiers involved in the LTCM bailout in addition to the Federal Reserve were: Bankers Trust, Barclays, Chase, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, Societe Generale and UBS. In this extremely singular situation there remain in Western political circles several doubts on the real strategic intentions of SWFs, especially those not tied to a free market economy, as in the case of Chinese market socialism. The main worries range from the fear that this mass of capital may be used for the procurement of natural resources at prices that are not necessarily market ones to the apprehension of their use as an instrument for weakening or even eliminating international competition in favour of national industries through hostile takeover bids; an escalation of tensions that induces one to believe that the security of individual states is at risk. These political risks are matched with multifaceted technical ones. First of all it is feared that these instruments, linked to nations that historically do not give voice to professional elites, may be administered by insufficiently skilled managers and professionals, especially in managing the necessary speed of United States v. Bernard L. Madoff, On March 10, 2009, a Criminal Information was filed in Manhattan federal court charging Bernard L. Madoff with eleven felony charges including securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, three counts of money laundering, false statements, perjury, false filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and theft from an employee benefit plan. There was no plea agreement between the Government and the defendant. On March 12, 2009, Madoff pleaded guilty to all eleven counts in the Information. On June 29, 2009, Madoff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 150 years.

Furthermore, despite the fact that sovereign wealth funds contribute to a small fraction of financial assets exchanged on the global market, they have proved to be continually expanding, taking advantage also of the fewer pressures compared to hedge funds to make a short-term profit. The actions of a sovereign wealth fund vis-a-vis the private counterpart do not necessarily have to be made public and, in the Chinese case, the entity and the type of funds invested is the exclusive domain of the People's Bank of China and of the Ministry of Finance. Therefore the movements and real developments of SWFs can be estimated only approximately, by assessing the behaviour of the private companies of which they are shareholders and which continue to have obligations of transparency. It is possible to envisage that in the near future the action of SWFs will represent a challenge not only for the present market rules, but also for political and government structures themselves.

As has been stressed previously, the increased importance of sovereign wealth funds marks the growing imbalance of international finance in the distribution of wealth. Moreover, countries that are submitted to the action of SWFs have a negative perception of what is happening to them: they suspect motivations that are not entirely economic or market-driven, and the possibility of political retro thoughts, fearing future interference limiting national sovereignty. On the wave of the fear that a state may intervene and dominate the industrial sector or manoeuvre international financial institutions, the risk is the growth of protectionism and the consequent weakening of international trade. Among the few SWFs that show complete transparency of their own activities we can cite the Norwegian fund born as the Government Petroleum Fund of Norway and later renamed the Government Pension Fund of Norway, that ranks at the top for available capital. Unlike the CIC, every year the Norwegian fund publishes its investment portfolio and the returns deriving from this.

On the other hand, what is considered a particular feature of the Government Pension Fund of Norway is the practice for private funds that have to account for their work to their shareholders. The halo of secrecy that surrounds SWFs underlines how much the strategies of many of the promoter countries may not be in line with the market economy and are tied to achieving political objectives. The lack of information on the size of profits and losses and direct control by political circles over purely economic matters, can easily lead to abuses and foster corruption and malpractice. At the same time one should not underestimate the conflicts of interest of a sovereign wealth fund, in that every movement it is perceived by the country in which the investment is made as a move by a foreign nation and therefore assessed also at a geopolitical level.

To give a concrete example, the Temasek Fund has created disagreement between the governments of Singapore and Thailand, following the takeover bid on the Thai national telephone company Shin Corp. Despite the fact that the G7 countries still maintain close control over the regulating mechanisms of the world economic system, the very role of the World Bank (WB) and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be seriously questioned by the emerging economies and the action of the sovereign wealth funds. Fear and uncertainty can provoke undesirable reactions, connected to behavioural and non mar"r:r: oriented reactions such as what happened with the Japanese economic boom in the 1980s. During the 1970s the Japanese economy was growing at double the rate of those of the economies of other industrialised countries. Much of the success was due to an increase in efficiency and the optimisation of production systems, accompanied by constant research and innovation. This progressive expansion of Japanese industry generated fears and uncertainties regarding its possible conquest of the leadership of the world economy to the detriment of the US and European economies in key sectors, such as the automobile industry and that of consumer electronics. Such forecasts proved to be groundless immediately after the collapse of the stock market and of prices in the real estate sector, helped on by a weak banking system and the ill-advised measures of the Japanese state in restricting monetary policy. 

Today, while treating the similarity with caution, the prominent role of China on the international markets, dictated by the surplus of foreign exchange reserves built up thanks to exports, is viewed by the industrialised countries with the same vigour as that of Japan in the 1980s. In particular the PRC's US$4 trillion of foreign exchange reserves [10, p.185]., if read in parallel to the liquidity crisis triggered by the American sub-prime mortgages, automatically lead to putting the country in the limelight on the international finance scene as an economy with growing potentialities. Actually the management policy of the financial resources of the Chinese Central Bank has always been defensive, [11, p.134]. thanks to the lowrisk investments tied essentially to American debt, through the purchase of TBonds.

The recent Chinese move to create CIC in the second half of 2007 a fund linked to the search for a better use of its foreign exchange surplus is similar to that undertaken by Middle Eastern countries for the use of the large flows of petrodollars. The choice to set up the CIC thus comes at the end of the decade of restructuring the Chinese banking system. The use of this investment instrument entails not only greater risks and higher management costs, but also the need for very well qualified human resources with years of experience behind them. It was no mere chance that the choice of leading the CIC fell on Lou Jiwei (at that time Vice Minister of Finance and now Minister of Finance) who has many years of experience in the management of high profile public resources.

The CIC, like other SWFs, appears as an active investor and one that is more aggressive in the choice of risk level, differentiating itself from the previous government choices of setting aside reserves in T-Bonds and ready liquidity foreign exchange [12, p. 85].

The authoritarian capitalist model proposed by the People's Republic of China is based on 65 years of centrally decided economic policies and imposed on the up to the market economy, launched by Premier Deng Xiaoping, has led to an absolutely original alliance between central control and market economy, and that reflects on one hand the strictly pragmatic characteristics of Chinese commercial and entrepreneurial spirit, and on the other the capacity for managing the contradictions of the Chinese way of thinking, that is very distant from the Western style of Aristotelian linear logics.

At present the Beijing model rather than being considered as in a transition stage towards the American model, as was supposed only few years ago, is beginning to propose itself to China's Asian neighbours and to the entire world as an alternative solution. Also the models offered by other sovereign wealth funds, such as the Middle Eastern ones and the Russian one [13, p. 83], reflect an authoritarian type of capitalism that differs from the Chinese model and is based on oligarchic control. The total discretionary power in the use of economic resources [14, p. 126] leads to the belief that the objectives of these sovereign wealth funds are aimed at the interest of a restricted circle of investors and not of the whole country. In this sense it is legitimate to claim that the process of globalisation is going through a new stage: passing through a redefinition of its own terms, it will also lead to a change in the capitalist system. The question of the process of globalisation has been completely reopened by the recent upheavals of the financial markets and by the new challenge launched by the multinationals of developing countries towards the developed ones [15, p. 148]. The widening of the Yuan's zone of action via currency swaps could lead to an extension of market socialism's area of influence and the extensive use of foreign exchange reserves in foreign countries could provide an important leverage on foreign governments for the acceptance of the new Chinese economic principles. The recent turbulence of world markets not only has interrupted a decade old growth trend of the major economies, but has put an end to Chinese double digit GDP growth expectations based solely on exports. Also with the crisis of the Euro zone, the role of primary importance that the Yuan is acquiring in respect to other foreign currencies and, as a non-too veiled criticism of the American economic system, that is considered the cause that triggered the crisis [16, p. 137].

The Yuan's advance is not limited only to the US dollar, but also involves the Euro and the Japanese Yen, whose weakness still weighs on the instability of the financial markets.

As it is still not easy to define with any certainty the notion of market socialism, it is even less simple to place within this "ideological framework" the actions and guidelines of the Chinese SWF itself. The location of the CIC in the panorama of sovereign wealth funds, in terms of transparency and control by the institutions, is half way between the position of extreme secrecy of the Middle Eastern funds and the maximum transparency of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. This basic ambiguity does not allow the CIC to present itself to the media as a champion of transparency, nor to foreign governments as only a financial body devoid of any influence of the international policy of the People's Republic of China. The statements published on the fund's official website, and emphasised several times in public speeches by Lou Jiwei [17, p. 177] on how the CIC is a financial investment vehicle seeking to maximise the use of its own foreign currency reserves, contrast with the ultimate objective of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund, namely that of serving the nation that has created it. Unlike the CIC, the Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds are considered "safes for family assets", whose only aim is to conserve the wealth, free from any internal political pressure and from any possibility that they come under media scrutiny. Nonperforming investment choices are not scrutinized and criticised by the local media, in that the government that supports them is managed by the same families that the fund represents. When making a deeper analysis of the CIC's conduct on the issue of transparency it is right to consider the fact that the fund, in addition to having the possibility of using specially set up companies to manage a single investment, can also avail itself of lines of credit or acquisitions made through Chinese commercial banks, in which it is a passive investor. Like Temasek, that was initially used by the government of Singapore to recapitalise and restructure many of the island state companies, also the CIC manages local Chinese firms. In particular it has given the goahead for the recapitalisation of four of the major investment banks, the last being the China Development Bank, and a dozen financial companies. In addition to what has already been mentioned, the domestic investments are more related to national development policies and are not bound by the freedom of action and the long-term targets propounded by Lou. As a matter of fact the CIC's greatest revenues during 2008-9 come from those very investments made inside China. As in the case of Singapore, all the Chinese wealth fund's investments on its own territory are purely passive and therefore the fund cannot interfere in the daily work of the company in which it has invested. It is worth pointing out that the banks in which the CIC has injected capital have already started to make both active and passive foreign investments and, at this point, it is legitimate to wonder whether or not such operations are a continuation of the CIC's investment strategy. In this sense, the CIC pursues the mandate of supporting Chinese companies that need funds to penetrate the foreign market. Furthermore access to the CIC's reserves could come directly from the commercial banks, that already have a good knowledge of the firms their clients in which to invest. This situation would cause new friction with the Central Bank, that manages through the SAFE the financing of foreign activities of all Chinese companies, be they state-owned or private. Given that statistically, the financing of these activities in the past did not reap high profits for the Central Bank, the CIC's choice of engaging in the same strategy may corroborate the hypothesis according to which the sovereign wealth fund's new route is of a purely political nature and not exclusively aimed at maximising profit.

The corporate governance model promoted within the CIC, despite the fact that it is presented to the public as purely free-market, as time passes it increasingly has the hallmarks of market socialism. Characteristics that may be summed up as a search for equilibrium and pragmatism oriented towards long term development. In this sense Lou's claims on the search for long-term investments may be interpreted in two different ways. The first, linked to the free market economy, presents a time span for action not related to short-term speculations or short selling, while the second, related to the development of the nation and not exclusively to the preservation of the sovereign wealth fund itself, has greater and deeper implications. This complexity makes it hard to predict the future conduct of the CIC and the effect that the fund will have on international markets and on the new role of globalization. The recent turbulence on the financial markets that has seen a domino effect in the fall of Western investment banks, from the most noted American institutions to the British Royal Bank of Scotland, is a replay of the debt situation in which Chinese banks found themselves in the 1980s and 1990s. However, while the Western governments seem to be oriented towards a substantial rationalisation of the bankrupt banks, the action taken by the Chinese government in 1990 led to a real overhaul of the national banking system, that allowed limiting the insolvency of state-owned companies and the volume of nonperforming loans and this has improved risk management and credit management practices. Now, less than two decades later, the Chinese banks find themselves in a position of presumed much greater solidity than their American and European counterparts, still taking in to account the Damocles' sword generated by Chinese province bad loans and shadow economy. 

According to opinions expressed by the management committee of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund, the principles of market socialism can produce a beneficial and stabilising effect on the international scenario; during the financial crisis former Premier Wen has recalled, the rest of the world must not expect China to take on the role of saviour of the financial markets. During the current financial slow down and the change of economic model structure from exporting country to a consumer market, the solidity and liquidity of the Chinese banking sector is the conditio sine qua поп to maintain sound foundations for the development of the country. By maintaining high the expectations of the country's growth with the promotion of mass consumption, China is ready to cope with the shrinking European and USA market needs.

Conclusion

In this context, the future of the CIC and Chinese SOEs ODI is going to amplify Russian [18, p.188] and American concerns over possible hidden agendas. These anxieties are not only a matter of Western fear of China' economic and political resurgence. On national soil China also wants to avoid any kind of high risk investments failures. Due to a better diffusion of information via Internet, any financial mistaken made abroad by the CIC and SOEs is going to be amplified back to China. This kind of exposure could stir up economic and social instability at home, given that some 500 million rural Chinese are still not privy to the economic growth and improvements in quality of life enjoyed by a portion of its population. Therefore China's use of sovereign fund still carries with it the inherent risk producing a negative domestic impact. Inappropriate use of ODIs or just a sudden economic downturn can, over a period of months, undermine decades of stabilization policies and structural economic reforms aimed at a stable 7.5% year GDP growth. On this respect a single lapse in judgment in terms of foreign investment risks will generate a huge loss of capital. It follows that the cost to invest in unstable areas of the world can't be measured merely in terms of financial value and foreign policy preferences.

 

 

References

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  9. Source: http://www.swfmstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (October 2014)
  10. http://www.iust.ice.:gov/usao/nys/vvv_cases/rnadoff.html
  11. Source:http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/4768bd3c-c461-lle3-8dd4-Q0144 html (2014).
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  13. Bellacqua J. 2010, The Future of China-Russia relations", University press of
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  18. Vatansever, A., 2005, Russian's Growing Dependence on Oil and it's Venture into a Stabilization Fund, Institute for the Analysis of Global

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