Economic Aspects of the Revival of Tibetan Buddhism in post-Mao China in a Historical Perspective

The aim of my contribution is to analyze the issue of the changes in monastic economy of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries after the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1951 in a broader historical context. This research is part of a larger project which deals with the religious policy in the PRC and it attempts to answer the question of continuity/discontinuity in the approaches towards religion between Imperial, Republican and socialist China with special focus on Tibetan Buddhism which represents a distinctive challenge for the Chinese perception of religion. Although the economic aspects represent only a part of this comprehensive issue, it illustrates the broader context of the developments of religious policy in China.

vAccording to the 18th century Imperial Code of the Chinese Qing 青 Dynasty (1644-1911) «these folks [i.e. Chinese Buddhist monks] do not plough, and have no trades or callings; so they dress and eat on the cost of the people; why then shall we allow them to build [monasteries] and thereby waste the wealth of the people?» [1]. This short passage illustrates in a nutshell the basic attitude of Chinese Imperial State towards Buddhist sangha. Since the spread of Buddhism in China in the 3rd-4th centuries A.D. the Buddhist sangha «had to seek recognition in a society where the conception of governmental authority was incompatible with the existence of asocial, improductive and autonomous body within the state and where systems of thought used to be evaluated according to their practical efficacy rather than to their religious and metaphysical merits» [2]. Starting from the 4th century A.D. in Chinese sources one finds a number of documents and edicts promulgated by the Confucian elite which while criticizing Chinese Buddhist monks highlighted — besides political and ideological – also economic arguments against their «unproductivity» and «parasitism» of the Buddhist monastic community which represented a danger for the government revenue. The  ill-famed

edict of the Tang Dynasty 唐朝 emperor Wuzong 武宗 (ruled 840–846) issued in 845 A.D. which triggered the large-scale persecution of Buddhism in China had focused on the huge size of the monastic community and its negative impact on the economy: «At the present moment, there are innumerable monks and nuns under heaven who wait for farmers to feed them and women to clothe them. (…) More than 100 000 idle and lazy persons have already been driven out of monasteries» [3]. As documented also by the quote from the 18th century this negative perception of sangha showed a long persistence.

However, this negative approach towards Buddhism — with special focus on its economic involvement — in China was in deep contradiction with the role of Buddhist institutions in traditional pre-1950 Tibet where in the mid-17th century a distinctive socio-political system characterized by the close relationship between religious authority and political power was established. The traditional political system of Central Tibet is described in Tibetan as «having two [powers]: religious and political» (Tib. chos srid gnyis ldan) which reflected the fact, that the supreme political and religious power rested in the hands of the successive incarnations of the Dalai Lama [4]. The ecclesiastic elite of Tibetan society played an important role in government institutions and therefore the Tibetan polity is often characterized as theocratic. Due to this position the Buddhist clergy successfully asserted also its economic interests and thus religious institutions and Buddhist hierarchs accounted for over a third of arable land in Central Tibet and in pastoral areas they were the largest owner of livestock (about 50%) [5]. The population in the vicinity of monasteries had to pay various taxes (transportation corvée, agricultural work on monastic estates, escort service for officials etc.) to these religious institutions, while further income of large monasteries came from usury (high interest monetary loans and lending of grain), participation in commerce and income from religious services for the community (donations collected from believers, chanting of Sutras etc.). The large monastic community — in pre-1950 Central Tibet there were about 110 000 monks, i.e. about 20% of the male population [6] — was an important economic factor. After 1951 the political role and economic power of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries represented a specific problem of the Chinese religious policy in Tibet.

As Tibet was till 1950 outside of the direct administrative control of Chinese Imperial or Republican authorities, the limits imposed on the size and property of Buddhist institutions in China were not implemented there. The foundation of the PRC in October 1949 and the incorporation of Tibet in May 1951 started the process of dramatic changes. The religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reflected the traditionally negative perception of Marxism towards religion and its guiding principle was the separation of politics and religion (Chin. zheng jiao fenli de yuanze 政教分離的原則). After the foundation of the PRC

the socialist state strived to create an administrative, legal and institutional framework for the implementation of religious policy. In September 1949 the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference adopted the «Common Program» (Chin. Gongtong gangling 共同纲领) which served as the provisional constitution: the article 5 guarantees the freedom of religious belief, but the article 3 declares the goal to requisition the

land belonging to ancestral shrines, temples, monasteries and churches [7] and this political goal was further stressed in the law on land reform issued in 1950 which explicitly mentioned «confiscation of land of temples, churches» etc. [8]. These changes in early 1950s influenced primarily the religious life of Chinese Buddhists and in the first phase they were focused on the economic aspects of the functioning of Chinese Buddhist monasteries. In the course of the land reform which was launched in 1950 the monasteries’ land was requisitioned and redistributed to peasants while the individual monks were also allocated some plots [9]. The official campaign under the slogan «lay equal stress on farming and meditation» (Chin. nong chan

bingzhong 农禅并重) forced monasteries to establish production units in the field of agriculture, handicrafts, light industry, services and the monks and nuns were obliged to work in these units. These measures were adopted with the aim to raise the economic autonomy of Buddhist monasteries and thus shift the financial burden in the form of voluntary donations from the laity and at the same time to reduce the size of monastic communities. Some members of the Buddhist elite considered the participation of monks in physical labor as a means to legitimize the existence of Buddhist sangha under socialist regime. The participation of monks in production represented the implementation of the so-called Three-Self principle (Chin. san zi 三自; self-administration, self-propagation and self-support) which has been the blueprint of Chinese religious policy since 1949 [10]. Despite the officially guaranteed religious freedom the economic reforms dramatically changed the character of Chinese Buddhism, limited the religious activities and minimized the scope of Chinese sangha.

Due to the guarantees of the so-called 17-Point Agreement concluded between the central Chinese government and the local Tibetan government in May 1951 in Beijing, which in its 7th provision stipulates   that

«the policy of freedom of religious belief … shall be carried out. (…) The central authorities will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries» [11], the traditional political system in Tibetan areas was maintained in the first years and the central government did not implement its economic policy towards Tibetan monasteries. In mid-1950s the first measures towards land reform and collectivization were  launched in peripheral regions of Tibet, Kham and Amdo, which were speeded up in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960). These economic reforms accelerated the escalation of the conflict between Tibetan sangha and the state as they had a destructive impact on the traditional model of the functioning of Buddhist monasteries and thus were perceived as a threat to the very existence of Tibetan Buddhism. The ultra-leftist government policy provoked an armed rebellion of the local population and after its suppression in autumn 1958 the authorities launched the so-called «democratic reform of the religious system» (Chin. zongjiao zhidu minzhu gaige 宗教制度民主改革) which with regard to monastic economy focused on the «abolishment of the feudal system of exploitation», i.e. confiscation of land, forests and other property of the monasteries, abolishment of tax collection by monasteries and prohibition of the intervention of monasteries in the economy, especially the prohibition to accept financial alms from the laity [12]. These changes — which were in implemented also in Central Tibet in the aftermath of the suppression of the uprising in March  1959 — represented an infringement of the traditional self-rule of Tibetan monastic institutions and represented a radical change of the traditional monastic economy which was shattered. The socialist state renounced the relatively tolerant policy adopted in the early period and opted for the enforcement of its authority. As a result of this suppressive religious policy the monastic community in Tibet was reduced to approximately one tenth and the remaining monks were obliged to participate in agricultural work. Thus the state authorities adopted in Tibet the same measures as in Chinese inland, however with a delay of seven to eight years. The anti-religious campaign which deprived the monasteries of their traditional income marked the beginning of the first phase of the destruction of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries which was completely unleashed during the ill-famed Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) with the annihilation of institutionalized religion not only in Tibet.

The economic reforms which started in 1978–79 had a positive influence on the minority and religious policies as the state authorities have attempted to find a new modus vivendi of the relations between the state and various religious and ethnic groups. The limited liberalization has launched a massive revival of religious life in China including Tibet, where since early 1980s a large number of monasteries were rebuilt partly with financial support of the government but most of the work and financing was contributed by local population. This resurrection of institutionalized Buddhism in Tibet again brought out the issue of monastic economy as the property confiscated in late 1950s was not returned back to the monasteries. The crucial political documents promulgated by the state and Party authorities on religious policy in 1980s and especially after 1990 when the policy of adaptation of religion to socialist society (Chin. zongjiao yu shehuizhuyi shehui xiang shiying 宗教与社会主义社会相适应) was proclaimed, as well as regulations approved by   provincial authorities [13] repeatedly stress as one of the main goals of the new religious policy the economic selfsufficiency of religious institutions which was promoted under the already mentioned slogan «lay equal stress on farming and mediation» as well as under the slogan «use the monastery to support the monastery» (Chin. yi si yang si 以寺养寺, Tib. dgon par brten nas dgon pa skjong ba) [14]. The large Tibetan monastic communities have been perceived as a heavy financial burden for the Tibetan lay population and as an obstacle in the economic development of Tibetan society as they do not contribute to production and the large numbers of celibate monks impede population growth [15]. According to official perception, monastic communities not only do not participate in production, but they drain large financial resources from the laity in form of donations and alms. In order to prevent this, Tibetan monasteries are expected to provide services and organize self-supporting production units, which would finance their religious activities and the livelihood of individual monks as the state — with some exceptions — does not provide any financial support for the monks. In order to implement this policy, monasteries have contracted land and orchards, established restaurants, souvenir shops, hostels, tailoring work units, Tibetan medicine centers, they produce and sell religious utensils and incense and these entrepreneurial activities should generate enough income to support the monastic communities [16]. In official Chinese documents these monasteries are praised as positive examples which «pioneered the new brand of socialist monks» [17].

Chinese sources also stress the importance of tourism as a crucial source of income especially for bigger monasteries which are able to attract larger crowds of primarily Chinese tourists. When since 1990s a «cultural and religious tourism» became popular in China, various religious institutions have tried to find a niche in the market economy. Numerous larger Tibetan monasteries charge tourist entrance fees and monks serve as tour guides for visiting groups. The local governments which receive in some cases about 40% of this income [18] encourage tourism and promote the monasteries as tourist attractions. This — in case of some monasteries — massive tourist presence is met with certain disquietude on Tibetan side. In interviews conducted in 2000–2009 monks from the Labrang (bla brang) monastery (Gansu Province 甘肃,   northeastern Tibet) voiced their fear that the rising number of Chinese tourists might disrupt the traditional religious life of the monastery mentioning the situation of the Kumbum (sku ‘bum, Chin. Ta’er si 塔尔寺) monastery in the Qinghai Province 青海 as a negative example of such development. They were also repeatedly referring to the fact that the Chinese visitors perceive the Buddhist monastery as a mere exotic curio, a kind of open-air museum of traditional culture existing only for the sake of the tourist gaze, and they do not respect its religious meanings for Tibetans. Thus the tourist industry represents both an important source of income and a new challenge for monastic institutions in Tibet.

To illustrate the structure of the income of Tibetan monasteries one has to rely on the scarce data from Chinese sources which provide at least a general picture. The 1993 gross income of the Drepung (‘bras spungs) monastery near Lhasa was approximately 550 000 RMB (i.e. almost 70 000 $) while over 40% of this financial sources originated from entrance fees, the rest from various other agricultural and nonagricultural entrepreneurial activities [19], the amount of donations and alms is not stated. The example of the other large monastery near Lhasa, Sera (se ra), proves that donations still represent an important part of the income, as in 1992 they constituted about 40% of the monastery’s income [20]. In 1993 the total income of the Labrang monastery was about 1 100 000 RMB (ca 130 000 $) of which about 15% was made up by the entrance fees and other 20% from other services related to tourism such as restaurants, hostels, souvenir shops [21]. The data available for these three monasteries gives a general picture of the monastic economy of large monasteries situated in the vicinity of urban centers, but for smaller monasteries in remote areas  where there is little opportunity for economic activities, donations and alms are the most important source of income despite the fact that monks and nuns are not allowed to facilitate nor encourage religious alms giving.

The issue of monastic economy in Tibetan areas plays a crucial role in the official discourse on the role of religion in contemporary Tibetan society as Chinese authors very often use economic arguments – this line of argumentation does not play such an important role in discussions on religious work in other statetolerated religions in China – which should support the restrictions imposed on the monasteries as far as the size of the monastic communities is concerned [22]. As stipulated by provincial regulations [23] since 1980s the local Religious Affairs Bureau (Chin. zongjiao shiwu ju 宗教事务局) have fixed a certain quota of

monks for every individual monastery and therefore only some monks have received the official status in the monastery and subsequently a long-term residence permit. However, the authorities are well aware of the fact that the restrictions on the number of monks in monasteries have not been fully implemented and they perceive the current confusing situation, with a large number of monks without official registration participating in the life of the monasteries, as a serious problem [24]. These state-imposed restrictions — which are in contradiction with the tradition of mass monasticism in Tibetan Buddhist tradition (especially Gelugpa) — should reduce the financial needs of Tibetan sangha while the political motives also play an important role in implementing these restrictions as Tibetan monasteries are perceived as a potential source of political unrest. In average, the number of monks has been reduced by administrative measures approximately between one third and one half in comparison with the situation in pre-1950 Tibet. Therefore some small monasteries in remote area fail to provide the villagers with enough religious services (such as performing rituals for weddings and funerals, chanting of Sutras at villagers’ home, etc.). Economic reasons — namely large financial expenses related to the enthronement ceremonies and to the maintenance of the residence of a particular incarnation — are listed in the regulations related to the process of the identification and enthronement of new incarnations, tulkus (sprul sku), who have traditionally occupied a high status in traditional Tibetan society and they embodied the supreme religious and often also local political authority. The state authorities have been striving to limit the number of enthroned tulkus by an administrative procedure in which it is necessary to secure an official approval and limit the expenditures on religious activities [25].

The issue of monastic economy in contemporary Tibet illustrates the different understanding of the role of religion in society in China and in Tibet as well as the persistence of some negative attitudes toward Buddhist sangha in Imperial and socialist China. The changes which the monasteries encountered in late 1950s and after 1980 have reshaped and altered their traditional religious practices. In the post-1980 period «one of the general guidelines to religious groups has been to help the country with economic development» [26], thus by engaging in various entrepreneurial activities Tibetan monasteries are implementing this principle and legitimizing their existence in the market economy of today’s China. The state-dictated shift towards commercialization of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries represents a new challenge for these traditional institutions which they have to face under the current religious policy implemented by Chinese authorities.

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