The article is devoted to the public service and its activities studied in the works of Kazakh intellectuals and exiles of the end of the XIX century. The author carried out a retrospective analysis of the scientific works and research. Special attention is paid to the peculiarities of the public service in the territory of Kazakhstan which was one of the Russian Empire outskirtsin the characteristics of national intellectuals and exiles. The first attempt to create not just a look of the imperial servant, but real, in accordance with the time, characteristics of a public servant and the public service as a whole was taken. Based on this research, the author concludes that, the public service on the territory of Kazakhstan was both similar to the whole empire, and had its own peculiarities.
The time when we can actually talk about public service in one of the regions of the Russian Empire, the territory of Kazakhstan, occurred when the tsarist government, following the path of harmonizing legal and legislative system, finally turned into a colony.
By the mid-60s of the XIX century, almost the entire territory of Kazakhstan became part of the Russian Empire. And the initial task of the colonial authorities was the unification of governance systems in different regions of Kazakhstan and its adaptation to the imperial administrative system [1; 156].
Despite the fact that the Provisions of 1867–68's were taken as temporary, only for 2–3 years, they were in force for several decades in Kazakhstan. The changes in the administrative and legal system with the Provisions of 1886, 1891 did not affect the basic principles of governance.
As we know from the works of the specialists investigating governance and administrative structure in Kazakhstan, changes in the structure of the Kazakh state began with the reforms of 1822–1824s with the elimination of Khan's power, if we do not take into account the reforms in the late XVIII century which were unsuccessful and had no serious consequences. Further reforms will completely change governance in the region and pave the way for the creation of a uniform administrative system in the remote regions of the Tsarist Russia.
As a result of the region reforming, governance organs and systems in Kazakhstan operated as a public service in the sense that could be qualified as a professional activity of public officers realizing official powers in order to achieve the objectives and functions of the state.
According to the Code of Public Service, it was differentiated into civilian and military, and, according to Cherepanov, also to religious service in the central regions of the Russian Empire State, when in Kazakhstan public officers combined these functions and the region was governed by the officers of the tsarist Russia. The existing hierarchy of positions divided powers so that the upper branches of power were occupied by Military Administration (Governor-General, Vice-Governor, Military governor, district chiefs), and minor posts were presented by the indigenous population (volost trustee, aul chairman). Besides, the positions, starting with the Governor-General and ending with the district chief were appointed either by the emperor or the governor of the region, the position of the volost trustee was elective.
One aspect of the public service characteristics, from our point of view, is the opinion of the Kazakh intelligentsia, exiles and notes of the officials who were engaged in research activities.
According to the reforms of the second half of the XIX century volost trustees were granted greater powers. This position was elective.
Indirect control system involved the use of local human resources to govern nomadic communities. They were elected by the colonial authorities, and it created a certain amount of freedom for traditional management structures functioning and traditional political culture reproduction. It seems to us, that the practice of election campaigns in Kazakhstan in the second half of the XIX century and early twentieth century demonstrates the principles of opposition among different nomadic groups. These principles were manifested depending on the officer election (volost trustee, aul chairman or elective) where traditional patterns of thinking determined nomads’ political behavior [2].
One of the nineteenth century’s contemporaries Abai Kunanbayev noted that hostility and opposition were inherent to Kazakhs, highlighting it as a feature characteristic only for them. «The Kazakhs are not similar to any of the people in their quest for wealth, power, boasting or hostility» [3; 38].
The main position which focused the attention of the election company was a position of the volost trustee. Almost all pre-revolutionary historiography unanimously claimed that the figure of the volost trustee was of prime importance in volost. The colonial system itself prepared such a role for the volost trustee legally, when based on the 1867–1868's reform and other reforms, the volost trustee concentrated administrative and fiscal functions, as well as court decisions implementation. According to the reformers, such concentration of power in the same person would give an opportunity to the upper branches of authorities to centralize governing nomads. However, the first years of volost trustees governing their rural municipality showed firstly that these officials are the source of official corruption, and secondly, spontaneous processes as «party struggles» occurred at this level of the administrative system which did not yield any regulation [2].
This division into the parties is described in Abay’s notes: «We bear malice, litigate, divide into parties, bribe influential supporters to have an advantage over opponents, fighting for ranks» [3; 12].
The leader of the dominant segment was usually elected a volost trustee which lobbied the interests of their nomadic groups using colonial administration functions entrusted to him. First of all, it concerned the use of pastures, the process of taxation and judicial execution. Such a situation could not satisfy other villages (auls) and in this regard, such forms of struggle as complaints, intrigues, fraud and the like were used in election campaigns [2].
For example, Abai, referring to the Kazakhs, writes: «We are at enmity, ravage each other, watching each other, not giving our neighbors a rest. Shall we live like this, trapping each other, remaining the meanest of all the peoples on the earth? Or will bright days come when people forget stealing, cheating, backbiting, enmity and begin to get wealth by honest means». And he himself answers to the questions posed to his contemporaries: «These days will hardly come. Two hundred people crave for one hundred heads of cattle. Will they calm down until they destroy each other?» [3; 39].
The nomadic groups or, in other words, parties that had economic superiority usually won in the election campaign. This group was led by economically stronger auls that usually meant the possession of a significant number of cattle and therefore having an economic impact on other groups. Another side of the benefit, which was used by the winning party was the right to control the collection of taxes by volost trustee. According to the legislation of the second half of the XIX century the statements on the number of nomad tents (kibitka) in the parish was made by elected rural municipality, which in turn were made up on the list of auls, provided by aul superiors. Thus, the lists of kibitkas which determined the amount of the collection and the collection of taxes itself, caused intergroup struggle at all stages of taxation. Ultimately, these statements were signed by the volost trustee, and the results of the collection depended on him. The main tax burdens laid on the losing party. This suggests the conclusion that most lower levels of the administrative system were managed not by homogeneous collectives, but by internal ones having a conflict. This conflict was detected in opposition of the smallest groups to each other who defended their economic interests. In this regard, the figures of elders or chairmen were controversial. In conflicts with other auls they expressed the interests of the auls but inside of it they expressed the interests of their genealogical segment, as it was noted before [4; 250].
The role of elders was minimal at the township level, but it increased in the nomadic communities. Aul elders were leaders of the main socio-economic cells of nomadic associations, in which the most active social and domestic practices between individuals took place. They sought for the settlement of relations between these cells in the highest degree possessing regulatory and judicial rights, and usually thanks to their personal qualities. In this regard, the activities of the elders was apparently multi-aspect. They solved agrarian issues, social conflicts, carried intergenerational continuity of traditional values based on adat [5; 288].
The interdependence of small nomadic groups on each other in nomadic livelihoods determined appropriateness of solutions to a greater extent than in groups with larger degree of integration: «Over time inequality in the distribution of pastures is the decision of the elders. One Kyrgyz having a numerous offspring has cramped Koryks, another’s family is not increasing — and he has extensive pastures. Clan’s elders gather and ask to give up part of thier pastures to land-hungry owners, they can not compel: Koryk is made as the owner property, which he owns in his own way, but due to established traditions. The case usually ends in mutual satisfaction: he who owns much land cedes a part of his pastures to land-poor one, defines new boundaries, prick sheep doing bata, etc...» [2].
The degree of the Russian administration influence on the sphere of traditional relations is of great interest and attention from the higher ranks of the region. Military governor of the Turgay region A.K.Heins devoted many pages to this issue. He wrote in «Motivated time instruction to the superiors of the Turgay region» in 1878:»Some of these offices are located in cities where the Kyrgyzs have only short visits, others like Turgay regional governance have their location even outside their subordinate areas. Constant absence from the area of their activity deprives the governor and officials of the regional board all the impressions of a local nature which makes up living knowledge and forms a true view of the Kirghizs governance. For lack of other means, it is necessary to get to know the Kirghizs better to be based on the paper side of things». The conclusion made by A.K.Heins was the fact that the basis of the Russian control in the steppe are only county chiefs whose real value in the steppe is poor. In this regard, he also said: «Fundamentals of the Russian administration in the steppe should be the district chiefs, not volost trustees, as it is the case now» [6; 211].
Many of the materials say that the district chiefs could not control the situation in their assigned districts. A.G.Arandarenko, an official in the administration in Turkestan General Government, described his impressions on the district chiefs: «Our district is 500 verst long and 300 verst across, inhabited by the Kyrgyz clans Alchin, Naiman, Kipchak, and is called Ust-Kamenogorsk district, along the main river Uhl. Our district chief and his management live not in the center of the Kyrgyz pastures but in the Russian population city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, and in the provincial city on the edge of the district. Russian authorities do not go to our camping grounds, and whether they know anything about our life is unknown. Our head, having a quiet voice, thin, comes over to camping grounds every three years when elections come...» [7; 17].
Often, district chiefs were seen having relationships with volost trustees that were not prescribed by law. For example, in one of the complaints of 1894 from 700 kibitka owners of Bien — Aksu district of Kopal volost on improper election to volost trustees of Myrzagulov. In particular, the complaint to the Steppe governor-general said: «... we complained about the harassment to the district chiefs and confiscation of livestock by our governor Tileubay Myrzagulov. After filing the complaint, the district chief gathered the people for the election of officers, governor and others. The district chief announced to people that they had to elect a decent and good man, and he announced to Myrzagulov that he could not be admitted to the election because of the people’s complaints. In the evening of the same day, the Kyrgyzs of the Arasan volost together with our governor Tlyaubay were at our district chief’s, and the next day for some unknown reason people close to the governor were elected election trustees of Truspek and, without the consent of the society Tleubay was elected a governor, and his brother Tuganbay as a candidate. There were a lot of such complaints for the district chiefs, which suggests that their role in the election campaign was not just neutral. If this evidence suggests that the relationship, though not legitimate, but is still present, Abay offered not to elect volost trustee but to appoint them by the district chiefs on a statutory basis: «Watching people immersing into conflicts farther away, I came to a conclusion: let volost trustees be appointed by district superiors and military governor. This would be useful in many ways......, volost trustees would not depend on the whim of the local nobility, and subordinate only to higher authorities» [2].
The control of the lower structures by upper branches of administration was very limited, since the above processes of «party struggle» that took place in volosts is not a result of certain groups of people and individuals activities. They were a new form of traditional political relations of groups with different levels of integration. Russian administrative and political system was considered by the group consciousness of the Kazakhs as an additional source of dominance in the competition for certain resources. Belonging to a particular genealogical group, the value of which depended on the particular situation determined individuals’ political behavior.
The bureaucracy also showed certain independence in judiciary sphere dictated by social features that influenced their role in society. According to Abay, biys-judges election in each volost was useless: «Not everyone is able to administer justice. To keep the board, as they say, «at the top of Kultobe» one needs to know the code of laws inherited from ancestors.... But they are outdated over time, demand changes, and there are a few of infallible rulers among people, and may be there are no» [3].
Ch. Valikhanov’s opinion seems very interesting to us. As S.Udartsev said, Ch.Valikhanov is a prominent Kazakh enlightener-democrat, a scientist — orientalist, philosopher and social activist, who left an imprint on the history of political and legal doctrines. Some hints and parallels in a long educational and democratic tradition of disguised criticism of Russia's order and policy in the guise of China criticism can be seen in the works of East Turkestan and his other writings. In this case, we would like to highlight a kind of thoughts about the servants, so-called officials. If we assume the reality of Ch. Valikhanov’s allegoricality, we will get a very interesting characteristics of civil servants and their activities. For example: «Chinese officials demand bows from citizens, they separated people and do not do anything. They receive salaries, and the people work hard to pay taxes and do not starve to death. Officials possessing the laws of inheritance have large capital collected from the people in the continuation of many years of harassment and extortion, they own vast lands, gardens, have several houses. Minor officials are as wealthy as noblemen, although they do not have family estates» [8; 102].
Unreasonable fees of the Chinese and native government and uneven distribution of taxes make it even more pressing by illegal fees that are imposed by native officials together with the Chinese mandarins. Thieves are made governors of the provinces in which they raged. Every Chinese official gets different life supplies for free, has customers of the natives, who are in their possession as slaves. Suspicion of Chinese and native officials has no limits. The police is vigilant and knows its business. Kashgar officials are chosen by the Chinese. They are strangers to the people they govern, they care only about their own benefit, to make a fortune, and as their power depends on the Chinese, then please their patrons in everything. Having learned only bad sides of the Chinese civilization, they are not available and are important to their subordinates, they humble themselves before the Chinese and spend their days in drunkenness. Minor officials copy the higher ones, but they are more rude and insolent. The officials are polite but evasive and suspicious with foreigners. The Chinese know abuse of indigenous officials well and treat them haughtily, but nevertheless they encourage their actions, because it is in their policies. The Chinese trust only those who oppress, therefore, they have nothing to do with the people. Most of all they are afraid that the officials did not combine their interests with the interests of the people; then they would be dangerous for them. Residents of six cities occupy the top places rarely, especially Kashgarians which are not considered to be the most reliable nationals. Generally, government officials, up to the sixth degree, can not serve at home. Thus, the Chinese achieve their goal: they make officials absolutely loyal to them. So, people hate the Chinese and the beks. The officials are for the mediation of foreigners in commercial matters. The natives, if they have ranks or money become inaccessible [9; 212].
Ch.Valihanov himself felt the tyranny of the officials during his intentions to become sultan-governor of Atbasar District. He wrote to F.M.Dostoevsky about his unrealized hopes: «I had an idea to become a sultan, to devote myself to work for the benefit of my fellow citizens, to protect them from officials and from the despotism of the rich Kirghizs (Kazakhs G.K.). At the same time I thought more likely to show the example to my countrymen how it can be useful for them to have an educated sultan-governor. They would see that the Russian official, under the action of which they made up their minds about the Russian education. To this end, I agreed to be a candidate in the senior sultans of Atbasar district, but the elections could not be held without some bureaucratic tricks» [10; 524].
The exiled intellectuals characterized governors as administrators which enabled bribery and theft flourish. Such notions as bribery and corruption came to the territory of Kazakhstan together with the control system. Although in some ways social — legal essence of corruption was that giving something for a gift was perceived by the Kazakh society as a tribute to the tradition of testimonial. And at the same time, the Russian officials which headed the regions of the state was not an exception in this case.
As it was noted by M.Bakunin:»… beginning from the top of the pyramid and up to its foundation, all the officials steal the most cynical way». Despite the fact that criminal responsibility was allowed for the socalled «bribery and extortion» among public servants, the only thing that the chief could reproach his subordinate was «grafts higher than his rank». According to Bakunin, the bribery was the norm to the extent that «an honest man must die among thieves». If the officer observes the moral principles of duty, and fulfills his responsibilities perfectly, «he must leave, he is a Jacobin, he does not want to take bribes». According to M.Bakunin: «Visibility is everything that is required from a good officer in Russia; visibility brings an advance in rank, order and money, essentially brings to Siberia» [11; 576].
N.Konshin in his «Archival essays» based on the secret information about police advisers and governors describes the activities of the Semipalatinsk governor Galkin. For example, it appeared in the gendarmerie reports that the Governor -General Galkin held very liberal views. This was manifested in ignoring their requests for delivery of information to the gendarmerie management and in open sympathy for political exiles. As a representative of the administration, Galkin had no effect on the elections to the Duma and did not fulfill service requirements in this regard which manifested his rejection of the autocracypolicy on Political Rights. Then the gendarmerie office noted hostility of the Semipalatinsk governor to persons who adhered to the legal direction. Proceedings were initiated against Galkin. «Illiberal part of society was extremely dissatisfied with the activities of General Galkin «who patronized unreliable persons. As a result, Galkin was transferred to the post of military governor of Samarkand region. In general, the characteristic given to the governor by the Assistant Chief of Gendarmerie Levanevskyi was that there was no case when General Galkin applied to any of the people convicted of criminal activities, the power of temporary governor — general (repression, closing opposition media G. K.). Galkin’s power during the liberation movement resultedin inaction, or to the policy of non-intervention» [12; 304].
Thus, even among top rank senior officers there were persons that can be attributed to the liberal circle of educated society.
For example, N.Ya. Konshin who was a correspondent of Petrograd newspaper and conducted his own investigation of police abuses as a lawyer and wrote an article about the detective department, lawlessness and violation of detainees’ rights who were arrested at Troynitskyi governor. Police officers’ guilt was confirmed during investigation. They themselves created obstacles.
As Konshin notes, people with a very shady past were appointed in the detective department. It was told about prisoners’ torture in the department. He found that «the Kazakhs were usually beaten in Klarin’s office, they were taken out of town to waste dumping ground, where they were tortured into confessing for an uncommitted crime. They extorted money». There also were people among Russian officials who sympathized the views of the liberal intelligentsia and patronized them as far as possible [13; 120].
Explorer and ethnographer, official of the Agricultural and obrok departments at Syr-Darya regional board O.A.Shkapskyi’s observation is interesting. The fact that there were honest people among the representatives of the Russian administration who do not blindly follow the orders of their superiors, is confirmed by the description of O.A.Shkapskyi’s activities as the head of Semirechensk party to divest resettlement sites by M.Tynyshpayev. Then he led the Resettlement Directorate of the Vernyi city. And as the head of the administration he reported the head of agriculture and land management Schvanebach in his studies that there is no land free from the Kyrgyzs in Semirechensk area. That he, Shkapskyi, was appointed to take the best land from the Kirghizs, and whether it is done by law or under the law — is not his business. After his dismissal Shkapskyi, as a political exile, believed that his duty was benefiting society as a man who was in the public service. His works are not without imperial ambitions, at the same time one cannot describe him just as «colonial administration officer». His works on local history had high scientific assessment [7; 286].
Thus, society’s traditional nature reflects the specificity of domestic policies by lower-level officials, causing corruption and abuse of their official position. Feature of bureaucracy functions affected the social character, displaying the position of lower-level administrative — police apparatus on the steppe territory in the ranks of the elite positions among the traditional society. The higher ranks of the colonial system, turning a blind eye to the kind of self-management of the steppe, generated rivalry among ethnic society on the principle of «divide and rule», despite the complaints of non-compliance to the charter of officials governing on place, strengthened the colonial power and weakened the resistance to the power in general. Personal qualities of the officials except for separate cases were insignificant. The main thing in this situation was the superiority of property, as the votes for elections were bought. The members of the same clan or tribe had authority, justice, and interests protection which displeased others. This injustice gave rise to search for more equitable solutions particularly in the Russian administration, thus popularizing and characterizing the colonial policy of the tsarism positively.
References
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