International politics today are overwhelmed with issues of non-state actors (such as terrorists) that have a significant detrimental impact on the main principle of international relations – that of sovereignty. The paper examines this interaction using one particular case of minority treatment in one of the closest neighbors of Kazakhstan – the People‘s Republic of China. The issue of terrorism or, as the case may be, the right of self-determination of Uyghurs in Xinjiang became one of the most important intersection points in the relations between Central Asian states and China.
The paper will present an argument based on Prizel‘s model of interaction between national identity formation and foreign policy decision making. This offers a unique perspective and a tentative explanation for such a strong desire of Uyghurs to secede from China. As such, paper may yield a practical lesson to learn from experience of China in managing ethnic minorities for the many multi-ethnic countries of the world
In post-9/11 world, the world revolves around the issue of terrorism and terror-related activities. Terrorism became a catchword of today‘s world politics just like nuclear exchange and Cold War were for a better part of 20th century. Clash of civilizations looms heavily on the horizon, only now it is taking shape of terrorism against freedom and democracy. It seems, that the world made of states, the system itself is fighting for its own survival, to avoid succumbing to increasingly powerful and influential non-state actors, whether economic (eg.,multinational corporations), military (eg., rogue states), or political (eg., terrorism). However, the outcome of this struggle is far from being determined and there is still a long way ahead to find out what kind of trends will eventually prevail in the international system.
However, it is also quite possible that the duality of international system is here to stay for foreseeable future. There would always be tendency to reinforce sovereignty as well as to undermine it. One of great examples of such duality is China‘s treatment of Xinjiang and non-Han minority of Uyghurs which constitutes a majority in that region. The peculiarity of this case, or the irony of it, if you will, is in the fact that Chinese activities to consolidate national identity of greater China in the wake of the communist revolution have both created a nation of Uyghurs were there was virtually none before and simultaneously propels Chinese leaders to deny any kind of meaningful autonomy to Xinjiang, let along the right of cessation and independence.
Therefore, this paper will attempt to tackle this quite interesting and in a way unique state of relations between China and region of Xinjiang within it. The main idea is that an interaction of policies of Chinese central government with identity of indigenous groups in Xinjiang, primarily Uyghurs, has both created the impetus toward establishing this separate identity, as well as attempts to curb it. To develop this argument, the paper will start with a reflection upon how literature on this challenge to Chinese sovereignty has been addressed in recent literature and how this paper may be a novel approach to it. Next, the case of Xinjiang will be discussed from the point of view linking foreign policy decision-making and national identity using Prizel‘s model[i], trying to see how internal and foreign policy decisions of Chinese leaders in recent history have essentially created this issue in the first place for them.
Xinjiang Literature
Surprisingly, such a remote place as Xinjiang generated quite a bit of scholarly attention even among the English-speaking academia, albeit only in the last 10 years or so. For quite a while before, Xinjiang remained relatively obscure in the eyes of Western observers, and did not seem to merit much attention, and as Dillon noted, before 1990s, ―there has been no comprehensive study of Xinjiang in English since 1950.‖[ii] () However, after the reports of inter-ethnic and religion- related violence in the Xinjiang in early 1990s, located so close to the strategically important and volatile region of Middle East and closely related to it via religion, the world‘s attention turned toward to this northwestern part of China to observe whether it is threatening to bear yet another fundamentalist movement.
Most of literature about Xinjiang notes how recent is the emergence of Uyghur identity – even though it does have historical roots, no people with such name existed for a few hundred years prior to 1935 when Chinese government designated oasis-dwelling non-Han Muslims as Uyghurs.[iii] Before that, Uyghurs were not even Muslims but the official rhetoric identifying Muslims of Xinjiang as Uyghurs, coupled with creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region after the communist revolution in China, provided a fertile ground for creating a Muslim nation of Uyghurs and subsequently caused them to demand true autonomy and even sovereignty.
Another major issue that literature on Xinjiang raises is the importance of the region for China. Some researchers claim that it is in fact the largest security concern for Chinese government[iv] while others are a bit more moderate in their assessment of significance of Xinjiang for China but still rate it fairly high. One major reason for the degree of vital importance of this region is the abundance of natural resources, and the other is presence of competing identities that challenge the nation-building project of China as a whole, considered to be just as threatening as that in Tibet or Taiwan. Latter is represents itself a threat to territorial integrity in most populous country in the world with already diminishing space for human habitation.
Third major issue in Xinjiang is identified as a certain degree of discrimination against the indigenous population, expressed in two ways. First, Xinjiang is being populated by Han Chinese settlers who arrive in great numbers and receive preferential treatment in terms of jobs, education, housing and other living amenities; while the locals have a hard time securing the same, as reported by Amnesty International in 1999.[v] Secondly, all the riches of the region are being constantly and steadily siphoned off to feed the rapidly developing economy of China, leaving very little for the development Xinjiang itself. Indeed, while Xinjiang enjoys one of highest per capita income among other regions of China, most of it comes from the resource industries rather than processing ones like in coastal provinces. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is the general attitude of superiority on the part of the ethnic Hans who frequently denigrate the Muslims‘ dignity in day-to-day encounters. In fact, Gladley argues, that such denigration is part and parcel of the Han nationalism discourse where all minorities are portrayed as ‗colorful‘, feminine and backward as opposed to the plain, modern and masculine Han culture (1994).[[vi] All of these contribute to increasingly negative perceptions about the inclusion of the Muslims into Chinese society.
Fourth, most authors also point out that a particularly important role in spurring formation of Uyghur national identity belongs to the dissolution of former Soviet Union, emergence of independent Muslim Central Asian republics and opening up Xinjiang to contact with them. All these factors have contributed greatly to Uyghur population in Xinjiang imagining their own independence under the title of East Turkistan.
Lastly, it seems that in early 90s, the authors were much more optimistic about the prospects of Uyghur integration in Chinese society than they became after mid-90s and Chinese clamp-down on the region (operation ―Strike Hard‖). Although when writing about Xinjiang, most researchers were trying to distance themselves from either party to the conflict, most of them still end up hinting a greater degree of support for Uyghur cause, than for Chinese one.
Overall, even cursory review of literature on Xinjiang shows that it is heavily dominated by historians and anthropologists. As a result, Xinjiang studies frequently rely on mostly descriptive, in-depth, and contextual methods of research. There is a wealth of discussions about probable trends of development and historical background of the region but very little in terms of political research. It is quite understandable given the lack of cooperation from the state and general secretiveness of Chinese authorities in regards of the state of political affairs in Xinjiang that might disclose Uyghurs‘ preference for greater autonomy and/or validate claims for self-determination and political independence, the very things that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is trying to prevent ever since it came to control Xinjiang in 1949.
While it may not be fair to expect exhaustive political studies about one region of a country, however, Xinjiang presents a particular interest in this regard due to highly politicized nature of the demands for greater autonomy/cessation among Uyghurs. It would also be fair to say that there is next to nothing in terms of analysis the relationship between the conflict of Uyghur and Chinese national identities and foreign policy decisions of the Chinese government, such as promoting economic openness of the region to the outside world, while shutting the borders down in political terms (i.e. Shanghai Cooperation Council, more on it later). The difficulty, of course, is in proving that these events are indeed interrelated due to lack of proper analysis and research.
Alternative to direct study of the link between national identity and foreign policy is an application of an available analytical framework, offered in theoretical literature on nationalism. By using secondary data from existing research, it might become possible to arrive at tentative conclusions about a probable relationship. The point that the rest of paper will address is that collective memory is in
‗dispute‘ between three, not just two distinct ‗identity defining‘ actors in China. There is a challenge to CCP vision of China coming from both Han majority intellectuals who see who challenge the conventional Chinese identity (i.e., Lung- Kee Sung); and from various minorities, primarily those in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, it will be argued that certain foreign policy decisions as well as domestic ones, adopted by CCP, had actually provided an additional boost to assertion of Uyghur national identity.
Historical Background of Xinjiang
Xinjiang, just like the rest of Central Asia, was a major crossroads serving long distance trade (Silk Road), warfare and mass migrations throughout the history of the region. Today, it shares borders with seven countries, all Muslim if not in the name, then in spirit. It covers a lot of territory and possesses a number of natural resources, including the increasingly precious oil. It also includes the largest desert in China, with most of its inhabitants residing in various oasis enclaves peppering the map of Xinjiang. There is no denial, that this region was and remains a strategically important territory and China coveted it in the past for a good reason – it provided a good base for controlling the Silk Road, and today it provides access to the markets of Central Asia and even parts of Middle East, as well as providing a good buffer zone against Russia, the long-standing strategic opponent of China, as well as against Muslim world, another historical rival of Chinese civilization.
Because of the vastness of the territory of Xinjiang, there was no way for common identity to form prior to the development of motorized transport. In fact, Rudelsonargues that ―the historical focus of the Xinjiang oases was not inward, toward each other, but outward, across borders.‖[vii] He even goes as far as to say that there were many Xinjiangs, each affected by a different civilization – Central Asian, Hindu, Russian or Chinese. The oases dwellers also tended to associate themselves with the oasis they live in rather than across them. This reflected in numerous cultural rituals, for example marriage, when most of it occurs within the same tribe or clan, members of which live near the same oasis.
It is not quite clear when oasis Muslims started to call themselves Uyghurs but apparently the term entered circulation in 1920s/30s. Designation of Uyghur ethnic group followed a Soviet classification scheme that was used extensively by Stalin in Central Asia to quell possible resistance to his control by designating a minority group and granting it special rights.[viii] After that, one of the formative moments for the identity of Uyghurs followed – the Ili Rebellion also known as the Three District Revolution, which culminated with creation of a short-lived East Turkistan Republic from 1944 to 1949, thereafter PLA took over Xinjiang.
In other words, historically Xinjiang does not possess a firm and clearly defined ethnic or national group to claim it as its own. However, in late 20th century there was a convolution of a number of factors, giving rise to independence-minded Uyghur nation. Some of them were discussed above, such as the act of designating a group of disparate people to a single community (oases Muslim communities as part of a single ethnicity, Uyghur); strange lapse in language policies which has revived affiliation with greater Muslim community; granting special rights to Uyghurs without actually delivering them, increased movement of Han people into the region provoking negative response on the part of indigenous population who were conveniently served with an image of the
Other, role of Uyghur intellectuals. These will be discussed next.
CCP’s Domestic Policies and Uyghur Identity
At every step of the way, CCP attempts to assert Han control over the Xinjiang and avoid provoking separatist tendencies among the minorities. One way of doing that was to follow Soviet example of setting up autonomous ethnic regions which started with identifying appropriate ethnic groups.
As mentioned above, a significant role in nurturing Uyghur identity was played by the early nationality policies of CCP which copied that of Soviet Union. Specifically, such policies identified group of people belonging to distinct oases in Xingjiang who primarily associated themselves with those smaller communities rather than with larger ethnicity spanning the Taklamakan desert.[ix] While it is still unclear how and when exactly Uyghur became an ethnic designation, most scholars agree that it came about in early 20th century or thereabout. It is true that the term existed earlier, in 18th century and before, but the true political and ethnic meaning it has acquired no more than a hundred years ago. In a way, it confirms the modern, constructed nature of nationalism rather than the ancient type. As Starr notes, that along with providing greater access to education, CCP‘s ethnic policies ―fostered the development, if no the creation, of new [Uyghur] ethnic consciousness.‖[x] This way, Han CCP appears to retain the custodianship over the Uyghur identity even though it is not their own, which, of course, only sets up a conflict down the path.
Surprisingly, the PRC‘s policy in regards of the Uyghur written script was not as consistent as that toward other aspects of Uyghur identity. In an attempt to break with the past and sever the connections between Xinjiang and the rest of the Muslim world, the traditional Uyghur Arab-based script was replaced with Cyrillic one in 1930s/40s and later on under PRC with a Latin one but neither one of those survived for long, with Uyghurs eventually reverting to the ‗old script‘ still based on an Arabic one.[xi] This actually reinforced the Muslim identity of Uyghurs and their affinity to the greater Muslim world despite the CCP‘s efforts to the opposite.
However, in Gladley‘s terms, re-introduction of Arab script could be constituted as part of the ‗colorfulness‘ of Uyghur‘s culture and, by implication, the inferiority of Uyghurs compared to Han.
More important is the gap between officially proclaimed autonomy and the actual policies of CCP in Xinjiang. Nominally, CCP granted autonomous status to Xinjiang region in 1955 with many ethnic party cadres in local government positions, which initially has involved nationalization – i.e. defining national groups and their members. However, the real power and control still resided with Han leadership, backed with Han-dominated Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (the Corps), a major economic and paramilitary force in the region.[xii] Furthermore, the autonomous status did not protect Uyghurs and other minorities
in Xinjiang from bearing the full brunt of the Great Leap Forward and the following Cultural Revolution that have assaulted the foundations of non-Han culture and ways of living and undermined the CCP‘s popularity among the minorities, Uyghurs in particular. In other words, the policy of autonomy that kept the custodianship over Uyghur‘s culture in Han‘s hands exposed itself as a ruse hiding colonial-like attitudes of Han toward Uyghurs. CCP, by trying to formulate and re-formulate collective memory of PRC (mostly, Han-oriented) while trying to incorporate Uyghur culture, has actually increased the tensions between the two by prosecuting or downplaying the latter in favor of the former.
One prominent example of the above are the CCP‘s policies that aim to urbanize Xinjiang and that way break down the old oases identity base which, to some extent, produced the opposite results. Uyghurs, who migrate to cities, do not lose their association with oases but do exactly the opposite – become more traditionalist in the face of CCP-promoted Han culture.[xiii]
Then there is the best tool available to the PRC‘s regime for assimilating minorities – the mass Han migration, accompanied with heavy emphasis on Han Chinese in all aspect of social life – education, prospects for employment and promotion, all marginalized traditional Muslim culture. Beyond any doubt, economic incentives for ‗converting‘ Han culture are powerful, indeed, but they also provoke a lot of bitterness and anger among the Uyghur population which sees itself being quietly discriminated against. Of course, CCP hoped to open up Uyghurs to assimilation by introducing large amounts of Han Chinese in their midst, but instead, they have supplied a strong image of the Other for the minorities, something foreign and not welcome in the traditionally Muslim territories. As a result, instead of diminishing the differences between the cultures, this attempt to overwhelm Xinjiang indigenous cultures provoked quite the
opposite – it became ―a strong force in coalescing modern Uyghur nationalism‖.[xiv] Last, but not the least, Uyghur identity is greatly influenced by Uyghur intellectuals. While most of them are very cautious if not readily coopted into CCP-promoted Han culture, there are still a few who promote Uyghur identity via novels and history essays that captures the minds of their readers. ―The struggle
over history now being waged in Xinjiang between Uyghur intellecturals and the Chinese state‖.[xv] This demonstrates that CCP‘s claim to custodianship over Uyghur culture is being challenged by the indigenous intellectuals who offer their view on what it should be.
The discussion so far shows that CCP has invested and continues to invest significant efforts into dictating its vision of minorities in Xinjiang and elsewhere. However, such efforts do not produce straightforward results, benefiting the CCP, in fact, they may be doing just the opposite. It does not occur because CCP is inefficient or shortsighted in designing and implementing its minority policies – quite the contrary. The argument of this paper is that the reason for the mixed or negative results of such policies is the conflict over the identity, the struggle over the custodianship of the Uyghur memory which involves CCP, the Uyghurs and Uyghur intellectuals. This could be further illustrated with CCP‘s foreign policies that will discussed in the next section of this paper.
CCP’s Foreign Policy and Uyghur Identity
CCP‘s single most significant foreign policy decision in regards of Xinjiang that have lead to fermenting strong, unified Uyghur identity was the sealing of region‘s borders after Sino-Soviet split in 1962 until opening the borders 1985. While before the region was subject to multiple external influences, with different parts of Xinjiang affiliated with either Central Asia, or Russia, or indeed Han China proper, the sealing off border created a virtual ―melting pot‖ effect by throwing all different oases communities into closer contact with each other than ever before in history of the region, which was greatly facilitated with Chinese efforts to develop modern infrastructure within the region. As a result, previously isolated oases of Tarim basis came closer to each other than ever before.[xvi] Han
CCP, by trying to exercise its custodianship over the Chinese (including Xinjiang) collective memory, by trying to turn Uyghur and other Xinjiang minorities toward Han Chinese have in fact promoted the development of Uyghur own collective memory which began to transmit between oases rather than between them and Central Asia and Russia, as it was for the ages. It is quite ironical, that by trying to shut down Xinjiang from external enemies of the state, CCP created grounds for creating enemies of the regime within. Of course, this new pan-Uyghur identity has never erased oases one but this isolation has been a strong factor of promoting the larger community among them.
After opening up Xinjiang in 1985 and especially after the break-up of the Soviet Union, CCP faces another challenge to its grip over the region. The example set by the newly independent Muslim states of Central Asia, the centripetal movements in the former Soviet Union, all of that encouraged pro-independence cessation movements within Xinjiang. While before, such activities were limited and not strong enough to merit special attention of CCP, the 1990 Baren rising have marked a turning point in relations between CCP and Xinjiang – they became violent. CCP ascertained that main reason for that uprising was the external influences, which was always considered a threat and major reason for closing up the region previously. However, this time CCP adopted a different foreign policy – they tried to reach out the neighbors rather than barring them. The major reason for that, of course, is economic – since 1985, trade was booming with neighboring countries was booming, and economic growth in previous stagnant Western China has receive a great impetus. Besides, newly independent Central Asian states offered great access to raw materials, previously available only to Russia but now offered to the highest bidder. Lastly, the Russian threat, which looming in 1960s, was no longer such a great concern as Russia was trying to cope with its own problems of economic development and saw an opportunity in expanding relations with China, as well.
As a result, the Shanghai Five was founded in 1996, transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, with a primary goal of curbing cessationist sentiment in all member states which included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan along with China, later joined by Uzbekistan. All these countries have had traditionally significant influence on Xinjiang and CCP goal is to mitigate that by co-opting these countries into the common set of goals that include preservation of Xinjiang as part of China, and so far, they were successful in doing that. All member states of SCO are happy to assuage CCP‘s concerns over external support of the Uyghur separatism within Xinjiang for primarily security and economic reasons.
While the SCO is many other things, the primary function in Xinjiang is to keep Uyghurs in check. In other words, CCP has finally been able assert its custodianship over Uyghur collective identity by using its political clout with the neighboring states which, in their turn, have cut the support to cessationist movements in Xinjiang for the foreseeable future. In some ways, CCP isolates Uyghurs and yet, the calls for helping brethren in Xinjiang can still be heard throughout Central Asia although they are now muted by the SCO agreements. For the time being, CCP managed to containe the threat of Uyghur separatism, it is far from certain for how long that will last due to continued violent clashes in Xinjiang between Han authorities and Uyghur rebels.
Conclusion
Xinjiang is a land of beauty and diversity. Many different groups of people have inhabited this region for extendedperiods of time. Such turbulent history makes it hard for any of them to claim this land solely their own, but in the world of sovereign states, it is absolutely necessary. So far, only PRC offers the most legitimate claim to this land but through its foreign and domestic politics of assimilating the indigenous people of Xinjiang, they have both tightened their grip over it as well as provoked a challenge against itself.
This paper has attempted to address the complexity of ethnic politics and nationalism in Xinjiang, an interplay between that of the major indigenous group, the Uyghurs, and that of Han-dominated CCP as the legitimate government of China. The paper offers a new insight into how CCP‘s policies could be so counterproductive. The simple models of assimilation and subjugation did not work in Xinjiang, often leading to opposite results. It is not enough to offer economic, political and social incentives to abandon partially or wholly once cultural affiliation, even if the latter is quite recent in nature. It is true, as Rudelson argues, oases identities are much stronger and more ancient than it is assumed in the literature about Uyghurs but it seems that the increased presence and indeed interference in local matters of Han Chinese and CCP has unified what was previous separate identities of Uyghur oases and gave them a common goal – achieving a modicum of autonomy from the increasingly authoritarian state.
This paper does not intend to claim its findings final or beyond any doubt. What it does, is to offer a different view at what is happening in Xinjiang. The suggestion is that it is not really a struggle between two willful powers over the territory but rather the struggle is over the minds and hearts of the population inhabiting this territory. This struggle is peculiar one important respects – CCP manages both to quell and fuel resistance to its own efforts to contain Uyghur separatism. When there was no common Uyghur identity, CCP created one. When there was no major threat to common Uyghur identity, CCP provided one. Now, when both sides are increasingly resorting to violent tactics to make their point, finding common ground seems less and less likely but not completely out of reach. The ultimate conclusion is that the modern state powers, even in such strong, centralized states such as PRC, can not really contain sub-state actors under their control. Policies of promoting common identity do not work as they should, producing contradictory and unexpected results. It does not mean that the state will cease to exist – but it may mean, that the role of sub-state actors will increase once again, as it was before states became states.