“The modern philosophical dictionary”, in which article “value” is written by V.I Plotnikov., according to it, value is “developed in the conditions of a civilization and form of their relations directly endured by people to valid samples of culture and to those limiting possibilities on which ability of each individual to project the future depends on and to estimate “other” and to keep in memory the past” [1] In this connection there is a question: and if this form worries not directly, but through or at all doesn't worry, whether that is it a value? A question: and if samples of culture do not have general meaning and are significant only for the certain nation, social group, at last the concrete individual? Also what is it “limiting possibilities”? Who and by what criteria’s has defined this possibility? And whether only ability of “each individual is connected with values to project the future and to keep in memory the past”? At last, if value is only the form of the relation to something it means that it “something” (as well as according to O.G. Vrobnitski and V.L Abushenko.) in itself doesn't possess valuable characteristics, this is not a value. Such conclusion follows from early treatment of values.
In 2000-2001 years, “the new philosophical encyclopedia” was issued. According to V.K. Shokhin, the author of article “value”, value is “one of the cores of the philosophies universality, meaning in the general non- verbalized view, “cold” components of most deep layer of all intentional structures of the person – in unity of subjects of its aspirations (aspect of the future), special experience – possession (aspect of the present) and kept its “properties” in hiding place of the thoughts (aspect of the past), - ascertain its private world as “unique-subjective life” [2]. At once it is possible to notice, that if all above mentioned interpretations of essence of value (V.L. Abushenko and V.I. Plotnikova) quite could be published in any Soviet philosophical directory, and given hardly ever. After all if those for a reference point take a society and public person (i.e. they social and anthropocentric) as quite objective a phenomenon, then in K.Shohin, at first, irrationalize values, at second exhausts them somewhere in depth of individual mentality. It is frankly subjective interpretation of value. In comparison with it, definition given in recently republished “the philosophical dictionary” of G.Schmidt, looks almost respectably. “Value - it is told there, - is not property of any thing and it is possibility to reveal essence and simultaneously a condition of full life of object» [3].
Thus, clearness in interpretation of essence of value isn't present. Obviously, realizing difficulties in possibility to offer the understanding of the given phenomenon, A.I. Rednichenko, in the article “value” for “the dictionary of philosophical terms” (2004) was limited delineating of a spectrum of the interpretation which are available in the literature. He writes: “the range of interpretation concept of value at representatives of various movements is wide enough: from understanding of value as special type of phenomena of a verified reality –“rag qualities” (Amisander) to ontology-theological characteristics of concept “value”at Sheler and others. [4] We are not left to do anything, how address to basic interpretations of essence of values and critically to analyze them.
For the first time, value phenomenon has been specially designated by the German philosopher and the physiologist R.G. Lottse (1817-1881). In the composition of "Logics" (1874 y.) he has spent strict distinction between life of a thing and the importance of its semantic maintenance and value. However at the full capacity the problem of values in general, cognitive in particular, has declared itself in works of neo-continians Badenskod (Fryeburg) school, first of all, V. Vindel bandem and G. Rikkert. The last one, especially treats the problems of values in works “about concept of philosophy” (1910y.) and “about system of values” (1914 y.). The second paragraph of article “about concept of philosophy” is called “value and reality”.
The logic of reasoning of G. Rikkert: a philosophy subject is a world as a whole, or the world as whole. She aspires to develop that is called as outlook. To reflection of I and the world, or otherwise – the subject and object. In mutual relation of I and the world, the subject and object noted by Rikkert, consist of “a world problem”. The given problem supposes two decisions. The first consists in that, proceeding from object, to understand world whole by means of inclusion in it, the subject, the second decision consists in, that, on the contrary, proceeding from the subject to build the world whole. So, Rikkert marks, that there are two opposite outlooks, from which everyone is unilateral and, hence, not true. One is objectivist, another subjectivist. Neither that nor another doesn’t solve an outlook problem, “the concept offered by them about the world, - noted by G. Rikkert, - it is too narrow. Both of them don't leave frameworks of the valid life, but as though wide we thought of life, it nevertheless only a world part. Except life there are still values which importance we want to understand. Only set of life and values make up together that, which deserves a world name». [5]
This is a main provision of G. Rikkert and in general of neo-continians Baden school: the world including the subject and object, not is the whole world, but only its part. Usual people, marks Rikkert, argue as follows. In some objects it is possible to find out the value. Them, also usually name as values. But it is a full mistake. For example, a picture or sculptures are named as value. But whether, a cloth, paints and a varnish of a picture or marble (bronze, a tree, a granite and etc.) – are values? It makes sense, notices Rikkert such objects to name as “blessings” distinguishing them from those values which are contained in these objects. However, value, undoubtedly, somehow connected not only with object, but also with the subject: after all it estimates the object. Then, there is a question: might be that, the act of an estimation and value are the same. So usually also think, marks Rikkert. Consider, therefore that without estimating subject there is no value, as well.
“We, - writes Rikkert, - meet here the one of the most widespread and at the same time confused prejudices in philosophy. Mixed values and estimation meets even there, where a problem of value and concept of the physcological act of the estimating subject, as however, any estimation and any will, in the same way as concept of value and concept of objects in which values are found out”, that is the blessings. However, value for us is always connected with estimations, but they are connected with them, and that is why, it is impossible to identify them with real estimations ». [6]
In our opinion, G. Rikkert acts absolutely correct by parting concepts of value and estimations. The estimation can exist and not exist, but existence of value takes place. Value is logically more primary that the estimation acts, and also the estimation, itself. But Rikkert goes further. He writes: “for value as value the question of its existence is deprived from any sense. The value problem is a problem of “the importance” (GELTUNG) values and this question not in any case doesn't coincide with a question on existence of the act of estimation”. The thesis that the question of value existence is deprived from sense and can be hardly accepted. After all, all values are concrete and so concrete the estimation acts: it is estimated, that is, the concrete object corresponds with concrete value. But values change, one appears, others disappear.
But G.Rikkert will disagree with such our judgment. After all he solves a problem of existence of values differently. He writes: “So, the blessings and estimations not a value essence, they represent connection of values with reality. Values thus, don't relate neither to area of objects, nor to area of subjects. They form absolutely independent kingdom lying on that side of the subject and object. If, hence, the world consists of reality and values, then in contradiction of these kingdoms, concludes the world problem. Contradiction it is much more wide than the object and subject contradictions. Subjects together with objects make one part of the world – the reality. They are resisted by other part, as values. The world problem is a problem of mutual relation of both of these parts and their possible unity». [7]
There is a question: what is this sphere, what is a measurement in which values are concentrated? Rikkert warns that the problem of values is insoluble from objectivist positions. Methadirika places values in a certain transcendental area, “the intuitive philosophy” (so Rikkert names philosophy of A.Bergson) places values in area till rational experience, in the immanent. Neither that, nor another, according to Rikkert, isn't capable to create the outlook, which capable to provide objective interpretation of the life meaning. If to search for that kingdom, “which would connect values with reality and that has laid down in a basis of desired outlook, then- marks Rikkert, - it is necessary to understand this unity in the sense, that both areas united in it, remain at the same time untouched in its virginity and feature. We search, thus, for an average kingdom, instead of any special third kingdom which is singly and independent, as values and reality, for these last settle alternative”.
This “average kingdom”, G.Rikkert connects with concept of sense. “The sense of act experience or estimation, - he writes, - not is neither life, nor its value, but hidden in the act of experience value, for value and as both communication and unity of both kingdoms, according to it, we will designate now the third kingdom a sense of kingdom that most to limit it from any life, penetration into this kingdom we will designate also by quite certain word “interpretation” (Deuten), in difference from objective descriptions or explanations (Erklaren) or from subjective understanding (Verstehen) the validity” , “To put it briefly, - explains Rikkert, - the sense inherent in the act of an estimation, on the one hand, not mental life, as it falls outside the limits of simple life, specifying on a kingdom of values. On the other hand, it is not a value, as it only specifies on values. And, at last, thanks to the average position, it connects together both divided kingdoms of values and reality. Correspondence to it and sense of interpretation (Sinndeutung) is not a life establishment, not also an understanding of value, but only seeing the subjective act of estimation from the point of view of its value for value, comprehension of act of an estimation as subjective relation to that possesses the importance. Thus, just as we distinguish three kingdoms: the validity, value and sense, it is necessary to distinguish also three various methods of their comprehension: an explanation, understanding and interpretation”. Thus, the world, according to Rikkert, consists of validity subdivided into object and the subject, values and sense.
From all considered we see that Rikkert, first, hasn't explained what is it value, its essence, secondly, didn’t opened the way of existence of values and a place of their concentration; thirdly, to it «x» has added also «y» - hasn't told the sense about which, as well as about values of anything intelligible. His work “About system of values” nothing adds as well.
The known founder of philosophical anthropology M.Sheler discussed a problem of values (1916). Being follower of E.Guserlya, Sheler tried to apply the phenomenological approach to research of values, i.e. to construct a phenomenological axiology. L.A. Chuhina marks: “in a phenomenological axiology of Sheler, value are thought as objective qualitative phenomena ordering to the person norm of obligation and estimations and forming a special kingdom transcendental over empirical matters, being out of an existential reality. Value, by Sheler, is a phenomenon, itself found out in the act of emotional intuition, a phenomenon which is not, out of an orientation on it consciousness » [8].
Position of M.Sheler, basically, a little differs from G. Rikkert's position, but certainly, on many details doesn't coincide with it. There are some differences, Sheler divides values on positive and negative. At what, this distinction, he considers, “is defined by essence of values and is significantly perfect irrespective of, what we can feel those or other special values of contrast …”, i.e. defined objectively-ontologically. Sheler give some axioms of the axiology, noticing that some of them were already opened by F. Brentpno: “They are that: existence of some positive value itself is positive value; existence of some negative value itself is negative value; non- existence of some positive value itself is negative value; non-existence of some negative value itself is a positive value”.
The axiom according to which, the same value can't be positive and negative relates here; on the contrary, any negative value is positive, and any positive value is negative”. Besides, there are “estimation principles: it is impossible to consider the same value as positive and negative etc.”
M.Sheler distinguishes value and value carriers in which values are shown. It can be various subjects, the blessings and etc., the special place among which occupies persons. Sheler gives classification of persons which according to it, is built in strict hierarchy: there are highest and lowest values. “That a certain value is “higher”, than another, - writes Sheler, - is comprehended in special act of knowledge of values which is called as “preference” [9]. The act. To preference, the neglect is opposite. The hierarchy of values, marks M.Sheler, can't be logically deduced. The person each time should define anew the status of this or that value in acts of preference– neglects.
In spite of the fact that some aspects of sheler’s theory of values is positive, as a whole it is impossible to recognize this theory quite positive. It doesn't answer on a question of essence of values, avout “place” of their concentration and etc.
Let's pass to the analysis of the theory of the values, developed by German philosopher N.Gartmin, the founder of so-called «critical ontology». But besides ontology, but on the basis of it, he developed problems of the theory of knowledge, ethics, an esthetics and history philosophy. For understanding of the theory of values of N.Gartman, it is necessary to give the short characteristic of its Ontology. The world, according to it, has hierarchical: it consists of four “layers”: unlimited nature, life, mental and spiritual life. N.Gartman writes: «Relations of layers of life can be reduced to three points:
- Each layer has own principles, laws or An originality of life of one layer never changes by means of categories of another – not the highest as they aren't adequate, nor the lowest as they are insufficient …
- In a layered structure of the world the highest layer always by weight is Therefore it has dependent life, and only “the life which is based on” …
- Dependence of the highest layer of life – not a hindrance for its The lowest layer for it – is only a bearing soil … [10]
Values, according to Gartman, along with area logic, relates to the sphere of ideal life. The sphere of values related to the field of matters, but isn't identical to it. Essence, distinguishes Gartman, “behave as laws by which real cases are entirely subordinated. In case of values it is not so. Real cases can correspond to them or as well not to correspond; and then in the first case they appear “valuable”, in the second –"counter valuable". Values are not.
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